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Funded pension systems have been evolving as the major source for retirement
provision internationally. The ageing process and the new accounting regulation
of market-based valuation of liabilities, however, have caused the costs of nanc-
ing traditional DB (dened benet) schemes to escalate dramatically and it has
become a struggle for public and private sponsors to fulll these funding commit-
ments. Particularly during the market meltdown of 2001-2003, many DB pension
funds either closed their doors to new members or froze up completely. Funded
pension schemes worldwide have been pushed toward a crossroad of reform.
In recent years, two directions for funded pension systems have been taken.
The rst entails abolishment of the collective arrangement, and a direct move into
individual pension schemes, where funding responsibility is shifted completely from
sponsors to individuals. Various individual dened-contribution (DC) accounts are
typical examples here. However, the DC schemes not only concentrate the risks on
each individual, but also confront individuals with complex investment decisions.
The second direction involves keeping the collective nature of the DB schemes, but
spreading out the funding responsibility to all stakeholders (retirees, employees
and sponsors). Various hybrid collective schemes are typical examples of such
practices. It puts forward the question as to how risks should be allocated among
stakeholders. Is one direction better than the other, or should both directions be
improved? These are the questions that this thesis attempts to answer.
This thesis contributes to the economic understanding of the relative strengths
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and weaknesses of both collective and individual pension schemes, and puts for-
ward several proposals for further improvement of funded pension systems. In
a nutshell, the economic added value of collective schemes lies in e¢cient risk
sharing, which is the weakness of individual schemes; The strength of individual
schemes is the potential tailor-making to heterogeneous preferences. The next gen-
eration of pension schemes should therefore combine the strengths of both worlds,
namely the intergenerational risk-sharing property of the collective schemes and
the life-cycle characteristics of the individual schemes. The detailed arguments
are presented in the following chapters.
Chapter 2 (Intergenerational risk sharing within funded pension schemes,
with Frank de Jong and Eduard Ponds) of this thesis focuses on one unique feature
of the collective schemes, which is the possibility of intergenerational risk sharing
(IRS) among workers and retirees covered in the same pension scheme. The key
intuition is that, the long term nature of the collective pension funds allows for
smoothing of risks across many generations. The collective schemes with IRS thus
provide broader risk sharing possibilities and mutual insurance benet, as com-
pared with individual schemes, which concentrate the (nancial and non-nancial)
uncertainties on single individual. We demonstrate that the well organized inter-
generational risk sharing mechanism within realistic collective funded schemes can
be welfare improving above the theoretical optimal individual scheme benchmark.
This new nding has profound implications for the pension reforms for both col-
lective and individual systems. The intergenerational risk sharing property of
collective schemes should be retained and strengthened, in stead of being abol-
ished, during the reforms. Our case study shows that IRS is implementable in
realistic pension funds.
Chapter 2 is closely related to three literature areas, namely the Asset Lia-
bility Management (ALM), Intergenerational Risk Sharing, and contingent claim
analysis. The traditional ALM framework takes the DB pension (contribution and
benet) policies as given, and focuses on the strategic portfolio allocation deci-
sions.1 Our approach is di¤erent in that, we integrate the design of contribution
1The insightful literatures along this line include Sharpe and Tint (1990), Campbell and
Viceira (2002), Hoevenaars, Molenaar, Schotman and Steenkamp (2007), Van Binsbergen and
Brandt (2007).
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and benet policies into the ALM framework; therefore, the pension policies (i.e.
risk sharing rules) are optimized together with asset allocation decisions. We show
that pension policy designs a¤ect asset allocation choices as well as the welfare
of the participants. Building on the literatures on intergenerational risk sharing
(IRS) which mainly focus on the public nance,2 we analyze whether IRS is desir-
able in funded pension schemes and if so, what the optimal design regarding risk
sharing rules is. Furthermore, our valuation framework in Chapter 2 is consistent
with the market-based valuation of pension and insurance liabilities.3 With these
contingent claim valuation techniques, we are able to decompose the market value
of the intergenerational risk sharing into call and put options held by each gen-
eration. We show that, ex ante, the market value of the call option equals the
market value of put option; however, the IRS may lead to welfare improvements
for the participants of collective schemes.
However, the collective schemes with IRS are not perfect either. One particular
criticism is that its uniform policies do not customize to the heterogeneous proles
of all participants. However, tailor making to each individuals prole is exactly
the strength of (ideal) individual schemes. Chapter 3 therefore examines the
individual DC scheme design in a realistically calibrated life cycle framework.
The study of individual DC schemes in Chapter 3 (DC Pension Plan De-
faults and Individual Welfare) serves two purposes: First, the resulting optimal
life-cycle contribution and investment strategies provide useful information for
the re-design of collective schemes, for example, incorporating the life cycle prole
into collective pension policies. This leads to a new work-in-progress on (w)age-
dependent policy design for collective pension schemes. Second, the resulting
optimal life-cycle strategies provide useful indications for designing the default
settings of the individual schemes. Theoretically, the default design does not mat-
ter, as each participant has the freedom to choose and implement his/her optimal
2Gordon and Varian (1988) and Shiller (1999) give a general exposition of these issues. Merton
(1983), Enders and Lapan (1982), Krueger and Kubler (2006), and Van Hemert (2005) discuss
the IRS in social security programs; Allen and Gale (1997), Van Bommel (2006), and Gollier
(2007) discuss the IRS in nancial intermediaries.
3Related literatures on the valuation of pension liabilities, guarantees and embedded options
in insurance contracts include Grosen and Jorgensen (2000), Schrager and Pelsser (2004), De
Jong (2008a).
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strategies. However, in reality, we observe that most people simply follow the given
defaults, which are often constant. Given the dramatic impact of default designs,
Chapter 3 therefore proposes age-dependent contribution and investment default
designs. We show that the simple age-dependent defaults dramatically improve
the welfare of the participants (above the current constant default policies).
Chapter 3 builds on the literature on life cycle consumption and portfolio
choice.4 This chapter closely relates to a paper by Gomes, Michaelides and
Polkovnichenko (2008), who study the optimal portfolio choices and optimal sav-
ing strategies for rational individuals with a taxable account and a tax-deferred
DC account. Chapter 3 adapts a similar modeling setup, but with a di¤erent focus
on the optimal age-dependent contribution and investment default rules. Gomes,
Kotliko¤ and Viceira (2008) also study the welfare comparisons of simple defaults.
However they only consider defaults for portfolio choice. We nd that the contri-
bution (or saving) default has larger impact on welfare than the portfolio choice
does.
One simplication we made in Chapter 3 is the annuitization strategies of the
individuals.5 Although we simplied the annuitization issues at the individual
level, we devote Chapter 4 on the longevity risk management issues at the aggre-
gate level. As we know that, longevity trend and its uncertainties drive the global
ageing and have triggered the massive reforms in the pension world. Both collec-
tive pension funds and annuity providers associated with individual DC schemes
are subject to longevity risk. In several notable cases, it leads to severe solvency
issues for pension funds and annuity providers.
One e¤ective way of managing longevity risk is by transferring longevity risk
to the broad nancial market via the so-called longevity linked securities. But
longevity-linked securities are not traded in nancial markets due to the pricing
di¢culty. Chapter 4 (Longevity Risk Pricing) proposes a new method to price
4 Insightful literature on this line include Merton (1969, 1971), who emphasizes on the role of
human capital, Carroll (1992, 1994, 1997) on precautionary saving, Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
on life cycle consumption, Viceira (2001), Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (2005) on life cycle portfolio choice.
5We refer to recent papers by Davido¤, Brown, and Diamond (2005), Koijen, Nijman, and
Werker (2007), Horne¤, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2008) for various aspect of annuity mar-
kets and annuitization issues.
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the longevity risk premia in order to tackle the pricing obstacle under incomplete
market setting. We show that the size of the risk premium depends on the payo¤
structure of the security due to the market incompleteness. Furthermore, we
show that the nancial strength of the longevity insurance seller and buyer, the
availability of the natural hedges and the presence of basis risk may signicantly
a¤ect the size of longevity risk premium.
Chapter 4 combines the literatures on incomplete market pricing principles6
with the literatures on stochastic mortality modeling7, in order to tackle the pric-
ing di¢culty of the innovative longevity linked securities.
Based on these ndings, this thesis also suggests several directions for future
improvements of pension schemes. The next generation of pension schemes might
combine the strengths of both collective and individual schemes. How can we do
that? For instance, the DC schemes could add prot and risk sharing components
to replicate IRS. The collective schemes could incorporate life cycle proles in their
policies. To sum up, with the help of pension engineering and nancial market
innovations discussed in this thesis, the sound retirement security is possible in
ageing societies.
6The related literatures on incomplete market pricing include papers by Cochrane and Saa-
Requejo (2000), Svensson and Werner (1993), Young and Zariphopoulou (2002), Musela and
Zariphopoulou (2004), De Jong (2008).
7The related literatures on stochastic mortality modeling include papers by Lee and Carter





within funded pension schemes
This chapter is based on Cui, De Jong and Ponds (2008).
2.1 Introduction
Systematic risks cause dramatic and long-lasting up- and down-swings in the econ-
omy and impose signicant impacts on millions of households.1 As a market
equilibrium outcome, in face of nancial crisis, consumptions have to be sharply
reduced for a signicant period of time.2 Allen and Gale (1997) argue that there
are two strategies which can improve intertemporal smoothing of risks, one is
intergenerational risk sharing via public programs and the other one involves as-
set accumulation via nancial intermediaries. Indeed, the private market fails to
provide insurance products based on intergenerational risk sharing because hu-
man capital in non-tradable and current generations cannot sign contracts with
future generations. We examine an important question missing in this literature,
namely whether intergenerational risk sharing (IRS) is desirable in funded pen-
1The credit crunch since 2007, the internet bubble in the beginning of this century, the lost
decade in Japanese market, the oil crisis in 1970s, and the great depression in 1930s are typical
examples of such systematic risks.
2See also Teulings and De Vries (2006) for an illustration.
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sion schemes with mandatory participation, and if so, what the optimal design
regarding risk sharing rule is. Our hypothesis is that, collective funded pension
schemes with IRS, due to its long-term nature, could be used as dedicated nan-
cial institutions to facilitate intertemporal smoothing of systematic risks. This
paper extends the literature on the role of intergenerational risk sharing within
funded pension schemes on intertemporal smoothing. Our study provides policy
implications regarding the on-going reforms of pension systems worldwide.
In this paper, we focus on intergenerational sharing of systematic investment
risk in realistic funded pension schemes. The schemes analyzed are stylized ver-
sions of collective (public sector, industry-wide, or multi-employer) pension funds
operating in countries like the US, UK, Canada and the Netherlands. In these
collective schemes, assets are pooled and owned collectively by young and old gen-
erations. Mandatory participation is required by legislation. The schemes invest
in the nancial markets, typically partly in risky assets (stocks) to capture the
equity premium. The schemes have no sponsor and investment risk is borne by
the overlapping generations of pension plan members. Surpluses or decits in the
funding process are shared among young, old and future generations by adjusting
either contributions, benet levels or both, which leads to intergenerational trans-
fers. Under this setup, we carry out a welfare comparison of various collective
schemes with IRS, and use the optimal individual scheme as the benchmark.
More specically, this paper species a number of realistic collective pension
schemes consisting of 55 overlapping generations (from age 25 to 80). During the
rst 40 years workers contribute to the pension fund and the last 15 years retirees
receive benets. Participants are short-sales and borrowing constrained, and their
only savings are for retirement purposes. The pension funds invest the savings of
all cohorts in one asset pool, and part of it may be invested in the stock market.
The return on the risky asset is exogenous and una¤ected by the schemes design or
portfolio composition. Fluctuations in asset returns lead to mismatch risk between
the pension fund assets and liabilities. Contributions and/or benets are adjusted
as a function of fund surplus. As a result, the schemes di¤er in their risk allocation
rules, which specify who of the stakeholders, when, and to what extent is taking
part in risk-bearing. In a dened benet scheme with contribution adjustment
(DBCA), the workers bear the funding risks, whereas in a dened benet scheme
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with benet adjustment (DBBA), the retirees bear the funding risks. In the hybrid
dened benet (DBH) scheme, both workers and retirees bear the funding risks.
Ex ante, contributions and benets are set such that in expectation, any new
entry generation funds its own pension. Ex post, a given generation may be a
net payer who leaves a surplus for the future generations, but also may be a net
receiver who leaves a decit to the future generations. In this way, funding risks
can be shared among many generations during a long period of time. The asset
allocation and risk allocation rules are chosen at an initial time and are invariable.
The collective pension schemes are optimized with respect to the contribution
rates, the adjustment coe¢cients (i.e., the risk allocation rule) and the portfolio
weights, both from the point of view of a newly entering cohort, as well as from the
point of view of a social planner who also takes the utility of future generations
into account. We also examine the market value of contributions and benets
derived from the optimal schemes, to check whether the schemes are actuarially
fair.
Our main ndings are the following. (i) From the entry cohort point of view,
the well designed realistic collective pension schemes can be welfare improving over
the optimal individual life-cycle benchmark. In a stylized example, the hybrid
collective scheme leads to a 2.3% increase in certainty equivalent consumption
per annum vis-à-vis the optimal individual pension scheme. Despite the fact that
adjustment speed coe¢cients and asset allocation are xed, the hybrid scheme still
outperforms the individual benchmark. (ii) Due to IRS, participants are more
capable to exploit the positive equity premiums by taking more risk. (iii) Hybrid
pension plan with exibility in adjusting both contribution and benet levels to
absorb funding residue are the most preferred in welfare terms. It outperforms
plans that only allow for adjustments in either contributions or benet levels. (iv)
The welfare gains for the new entry cohort are not at the cost of older and future
cohorts. From an ex-ante point of view, the expected welfare of the future cohorts
is even higher compared to the currently entering cohort. The key intuition is that,
the long term nature of the collective pension funds allows for smoothing of risks
across many generations, and risk pooling or forming a mutual insurance across
generations is welfare enhancing for all from the ex ante perspective. (v) Although
optimization occurs by the entering generation, the fund is expected to build up
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a bu¤er, and is, in expectation, overfunded in the long run. Therefore, both
intertemporal risk smoothing strategies (i.e., IRS and the asset accumulations) can
be used within combination in collective pension funds to improve intertemporal
smoothing.
There are a few di¤erences between our paper and the existing literature.
Allen and Gale (1997) and Gollier (2008) study the role of shareholder-sponsored
nancial intermediary (or corporate-sponsored pension funds) in facilitating in-
tertemporal risk smoothing. They nd large welfare improvements if shareholders
are able to contribute or accumulate su¢ciently large nancial bu¤er as means for
intertemporal smoothing. Importantly, they point out that, without mandatory
participation, the system will break down and go back to the market solution once
the bu¤er is exhausted or become insu¢cient. In addition to the potential thread
from underfunding, Van Bommel (2007) argues that intergenerational risk sharing
will not be sustainable when the fund is overfunded, as new generations might
renegotiate and raid the surplus. These studies suggest that without compulsory
entry and/or with the opportunity to renegotiating risk sharing rules, funded IRS-
pension schemes cannot improve on the market equilibrium in which agents act
individually. However, their models are much more abstract, with two or three
overlapping generations respectively. Our OLG model is much more realistic, with
55 generations. In such a world, it is realistic to assume that participations can
be enforced, and asset-raids can be avoided.
Furthermore, we extend the IRS literature with applications in funded pension
systems. Traditionally, intergenerational transfers are implemented by government
through scal policy and public debt management, monetary policy and Pay-As-
You-Go social security programs. It is well known from public nance literature
that well designed intergenerational risk sharing under mandatory participation
could be welfare improving, especially when dealing with systematic risks. For a
general exposition of these issues see Gordon and Varian (1988) and Shiller (1999)).
Some specic papers in this area are Fisher (1983), Gale (1990), and Bohn (2003)
about scal policy and public debt management; Weiss (1979) about monetary
policy; Merton (1983), Enders and Lapan (1982), and Krueger and Kubler (2006)
about social security programs. In the pension fund context, Teulings and De Vries
(2006) argue that it is welfare improving if individuals can borrow against their
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future labour income and invest before entering the labour market, and expect
that pension funds with IRS has similar e¤ect. Instead of assuming borrowing, we
model IRS within funded pension schemes with risks borne by multiple overlapping
cohorts.
The recognition of the welfare aspects of risk sharing within pension funds
is important. An analysis in terms of only market value may easily lead to the
spurious conclusion that pension funds are irrelevant, as argued for example by
Exley (2004). Indeed, the market value of contributions equals the market value
of benets in our collective pension schemes, and hence a zero-sum game in value-
terms; But the schemes with IRS are potentially welfare enhancing, and thus a
positive-sum game in welfare terms. These results have important implications re-
lated to the social security reforms worldwide. Due to the increasing demographic
pressure, many countries are gradually reducing (or planning to reduce) the PAYG
social security and promoting the individual dened contribution saving schemes
(see for instance recent discussions of Feldstein (2005) and Diamond and Orszag
(2005)). Our results show that the individual dened contribution scheme is not
the optimal funded scheme, even in a frictionless world with rational and sophisti-
cated individuals. Collective funded schemes with well organized intergenerational
risk sharing mechanisms are better choices from a welfare perspective.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the structure of the
economy and the preferences of the pension scheme participants. Section 2.3
introduces collective pension arrangements that allow for intergenerational risk
sharing. Section 2.4 analyzes the optimal collective pension schemes and compares
that with the optimal individual scheme benchmark, and looks at the implications
for old and future cohorts. Section 2.5 discusses the robustness and sustainability
of these schemes. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Economy, overlapping generations and preferences
Two asset classes are traded in the nancial market: risky stock index and risk-
free assets. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate, r, is non-stochastic.
Stock prices follow a geometric Brownian motion with a constant drift . The
investment portfolio is a mix of stocks and risk-free assets, with portfolio weight
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!t for stocks. The dynamics of this asset portfolio are given by
dWt=Wt = [r + !t(  r)]dt+ !tdZt (2.1)
where  is the volatility of stock returns. Both the expected return and the
volatility increase linearly with the fraction !t invested in equities. The Sharpe





The stochastic discount factor Mt in this economy is the deator for risky cash
ows, which in our model evolves according to
dMt=Mt =  rdt  dZt (2.3)
This deator can be used to calculate the market value of stochastic pension
contributions and benets.
The default values for the model parameters are in line with the values used
in the recent literature. We assume the (real) interest rate is constant and equals
r = 2%. The expected (real) return on stocks is assumed to be  = 6%, implying
an equity premium of 4%, which is in line with the long run estimates in Fama
and French (2002). The volatility of stock returns is  = 15%, which is close to
the value (15.7%) estimated by Cocco, Gomes and Meanhout (2005).
We consider an economy populated by 55 overlapping generations (from age 25
to 80). We assume that all individuals start working at age 25 (t = 0), retire at age
65 (t = R = 40), and die at age 80 (t = 55 = T ). During the rst 40 years people
work and earn a at real labor income which is normalized to 1.3 The population
(as well as the collective pension fund) has stationary age composition. During
the retirement period (R  t < T ), the individuals receive no income but consume
their accumulated pension wealth, denoted byWt. Apart from the pension wealth,
there are no savings. The 55 homogeneous cohorts have the same population size
and share the same preferences. Individuals have constant relative risk aversion
3All variables throughout this paper are expressed in real terms, i.e. scaled by the price level.
It is assumed that wage ination is identical to price ination.
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(CRRA) utility function dened over a single nondurable consumption good. Let










where  is the risk aversion parameter and  is the subjective discount rate. In
the baseline setup, we set the subjective discount rate equal to  = 4%, and the
risk aversion parameter  = 5 for a typical individual. In the robustness checks
we allow for a lower equity premium and di¤erent values of  and .
In the later sections, we use certainty equivalent consumption (CEC) as the
welfare measure to gauge the performance of collective and individual pension






1   dt (2.5)
2.3 Pension schemes with intergenerational risk shar-
ing
In this section, we model collective pension schemes that allow for intergenera-
tional risk sharing. Mandatory participation is required by law. We rst dene
the targeted pension benet and contribution policies for such funds, and then
specify the risk allocation rules which adjust the benets and/or contributions as
functions of nding surplus. Finally the design parameters are optimized with
respect to a chosen objective.
2.3.1 Pension liability
Since the collective pension schemes considered in this paper are certain variants
of dened benet (DB) schemes, we shall start with traditional DB schemes to in-
troduce the target liability, target benet and contribution rates. In a traditional
average salary dened benet scheme, the retirement benet is a xed fraction
(the so-called replacement rate) of labor income during the working period. These
pension benets are funded by the contributions plus investment proceeds. There
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is a one-to-one relationship between the replacement rate b and the contribution
rate p (recall that we have normalized the at real labor income to 1): The higher
the pension ambition, the more contributions are required. The actuarially fair
contribution principle requires that ex-ante each generation nances its own pen-
sion. That is, the market value of the contributions equals the market value of the








As described in Section 2.2, 55 homogeneous overlapping generations (40 working
and 15 retired cohorts) coexist in the pension fund at any point in time. At
the aggregate level, the sum of benets over all retirees is 15b, and the sum of
contributions over all workers is 40p:
For each age cohort x, the target DB liability equals the di¤erence between
the present value of risk-free benets minus the present value of yet-to-be-paid
risk-free contributions. The liabilities of the fund can be calculated simply as the




















Given the stationary age composition of the fund and the xed target benet
level, the target liability L is time-invariant. If the fund invests full in risk free
asset, then the actual liability follows exactly as the target liability L. If the
fund accepts mismatch risk, for example by investing in stocks, there may be
funding surpluses or decits with respect to the target liability. Let At denote the
value of the pension funds assets, which starts o¤ with an initial asset value of
A0 = FR0  L, where FR0 is the initial funding ratio. Let ! denote the fraction
of assets invested in risky assets. The portfolio weight ! is time-invariant and the
same for each cohort in the fund. This assumption is motivated by the observed
common practice in collective pension funds, where the same investment policy is
2.3 Pension schemes with intergenerational risk sharing 15
implemented for all cohorts. Then, the funds assets follow the dynamics
dAt = [At (r + ! (  r)) + 40pt   15bt] dt+ !AtdZt (2.8)
where pt and bt denote the actual contribution and benet levels which will be
specied shortly. In most of the experiments we assume FR0 = 1, but we shall
show some results with initial over- or under-funding. The fund surplus is dened
as the di¤erence between assets and the target liability level:
St = At   L (2.9)
2.3.2 Risk allocation rules
If the investments of the fund were completely risk free, there would never be
any overfunding or underfunding. However, with a risky investment policy, or
other sources of systematic risks, the mismatch risk has to be allocated in some
way. This is done, for instance, by adjusting contributions pt and benets bt as a
function of the fund surplus St and the target contribution (p) and benet (b). This
adjustment scheme is motivated by real-world examples.4 We now discuss three
stylized schemes, that di¤er in their risk allocation rules. These risk allocation
rules specify who of the stakeholders, when, and to what extent is taking part in
risk-bearing.
In the dened benet with contribution adjustments (DBCA) scheme, benets
are xed at bt = b, but contributions are adjustable. So, the working cohorts bear
all the funding risk. We specify a simple contribution policy, where contributions
per cohort are a function of the target contribution level p and the funding residual
per cohort St=R :
pt = p  St=R (2.10)
The slope coe¢cient  determines the speed of absorbing the funding imbalances.
The choice  = 1 implies that a funding imbalance is immediately fully absorbed.
A lower value of  implies that part of the funding residual is shifted to the future,
and shared across generations. Therefore the lower the value of , the higher the
4We refer to Ponds and Van Riel (2007) for a more detailed description.
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degree of intergenerational risk sharing.
In the dened benet with benet adjustments (DBBA) scheme, contributions
are xed at pt = p, but benets are adjustable in order to absorb the funding
surplus. In this scheme, retired cohorts bear the funding risk, where benet per
retired cohort are a function of the target benet level b and the funding residual
per cohort St= (T  R) :
bt = b+ St= (T  R) (2.11)
Again, the lower the value of ; the higher the degree of intergenerational risk
sharing.
The hybrid dened benet (DBH) scheme adjusts both contributions and ben-
ets simultaneously to absorb the funding residual. The contribution and benet
are linearly related to the funding residual St. More specically, a fraction  of
the funding residual is shared among employees and a fraction  of the funding
residual is shared among retirees:
pt = p  St=R (2.12)
bt = b+ St= (T  R) (2.13)
Under this rule, consumption before and after retirement is related to the funding
surplus. This resembles the optimal consumption rule in the classical consumption
and portfolio choice problem in the spirit of Merton (1969) where the optimal
consumption is linearly related to wealth.
The following table summarizes the di¤erences among the collective schemes:
Dened benet with contribution adjustments (DBCA)  > 0  = 0
Dened benet with benet adjustments (DBBA)  = 0  > 0
Hybrid dened benet (DBH)  > 0  > 0
When + approaches the risk free rate r, each generation in each period absorbs
only the interest accrued on their funding residual and passes the principal into
the innite future.
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2.3.3 Pension policies optimization
In practice the board of trustees decides upon the pension policies, taking into
account the preference of the participants. In line with this practice, we assume the
board of trustees optimally chooses the target contribution rate (p) together with
the risk allocation rule (; ) and investment policy (!), based on the expected life-
time utility of the 25-year-old entering participants. That is, the policy parameters
fp; ; ; !g of the three collective plans are optimized from the perspective of the
cohort entering at time t = 0. Therefore, the specication of the utility function
of the pension fund is the same as in the individual case (2.15). The optimization











with ct = 1  (p  St=R) ; t < R
ct = b+ St= (T  R) ; R  t  T
subject to the wealth dynamics (2.8). Since the pension fund is borrowing con-
strained as well as short-sale constrained, the portfolio choice is constrained by
0  !  1. The actual contributions and benets (pt; bt) follow directly from
the risk allocation rules (2.12, 2.13) in di¤erent schemes. To get stability over
time (i.e., non-explosive values for surpluses), we need to restrict +   r. The
decisions fp; ; ; !g are made at an initial time and remain time invariant. The
optimization problem therefore is static and can be solved using Monte Carlo sim-
ulations combined with a standard grid search in four dimensions. Appendix A
gives more details about the optimization procedure.
2.4 Evaluation of pension schemes
In this section we evaluate the performance of the optimal collective schemes
from welfare perspective. First, in subsection 2.4.1, we introduce the benchmark,
namely the optimal individual scheme benchmark. Subsection 2.4.2 then compares
the optimal collective schemes with the individual benchmark from the entry co-
horts perspective. Subsection 2.4.3 evaluates the optimal schemes from older
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and future cohorts perspective. Subsection 2.4.4 discusses additional sensitivity
analysis.
2.4.1 Optimal individual scheme benchmark
We consider two individual schemes, where the individual bears all the non-
diversiable investment risks and there is no intergenerational risk sharing. The
rst scheme is the optimal individual scheme, where the individual can optimally
choose his consumption level and portfolio composition (under short sales and
borrowing constraints) at any time throughout his life. This scheme serves as
the benchmark for the collective schemes with IRS, which have been presented
in Section 2.3. The second scheme is a dened contribution scheme with a xed
contribution rate which is chosen optimally at the beginning of the working life,
but the consumer is still able to adjust the portfolio weight throughout his life.
The later scheme captures common practice in the real world and is more realistic
than the optimal individual scheme; Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise (2005) use a
similar setup.
The optimal individual scheme (OI) implements the optimal life cycle con-
sumption and portfolio choice of an individual investor under borrowing and short-
selling constraints. During working period, the investor receives his labor income,
which is normalized to 1: The individual chooses his consumption stream ct op-
timally at every point in time, and invest the rest in nancial markets. After
retirement, the individual optimally consumes down his wealth. The individual
is free to choose the portfolio weight of stocks !t continuously, within the short-
selling and borrowing constraints, i.e. 0  !t  1. Formally, the individuals
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and subject to the pension wealth dynamics
dWOIt = [W
OI
t (r + !t(  r)) + 1  ct]dt+ !tWOIt dZt (0 < t < R)(2.16)
dWOIt = [W
OI
t (r + !t(  r))  ct]dt+ !tWOIt dZt (R  t < T ) (2.17)
WOI0 = 0 (2.18)
where WOIt is the accumulated nancial wealth in the OI scheme.
Because of the short-selling and borrowing constraints, no analytical solution
is available. We use dynamic programming to solve for the consumption and
investment in the optimal individual scheme. We use the numerical procedures
presented by Carroll (2006) to solve for the optimal consumption and portfolio
policy before retirement, under the borrowing and short-selling constraints, 0 
!t  1. Details of the solution method are given in Appendix B.1.
The dened contribution (DC) scheme di¤ers from the optimal individual
scheme in that the individual contributes a xed fraction of his labor income into
the DC scheme and consumes the rest of his income. At the entry date, the con-
tribution rate m is xed for the entire the working period (0 < m < 1 during the
working period and m = 0 after retirement). The individuals consumption before
retirement is therefore ct = (1 m), and after retirement the consumption is opti-
mally chosen. The individual adjusts his portfolio (!t) throughout life. Formally,

















subject to the pension wealth dynamics
dWDCt = [W
DC
t (r + !t(  r)) +m]dt+ !tWDCt dZt (0 < t < R)(2.20)
dWDCt = [W
DC
t (r + !t(  r))  ct]dt+ !tWDCt dZt (R  t < T )(2.21)
WDC0 = 0 (2.22)
The optimal contribution rate m is found by numerical grid search, detailed in
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Appendix B.2. Since m and p both refer to a xed contribution rate, the notation
p is used in the tables for both collective and individual schemes.
Figure 1 shows the life cycle quantile distributions (at 5%, 50% and 95% quan-
tile levels) of portfolio weight, consumption and wealth accumulation of the two
individual schemes for a benchmark investor ( = 5,  = 4%). The left panel
shows the results for the OI scheme and the right panel shows the DC scheme.
The distribution of portfolio choices (!t) is shown in the top panel of Figure 1.
On average, the optimal portfolio weights are decreasing with age. As explained
by Campbell and Viceira (2002), this is due to the leverage e¤ect of human capital
(or to be precise, the present value of future pension contributions). The desired
equity exposure in total wealth, including nancial wealth and human capital, is
constant over the life cycle. Individuals achieve the desired equity exposure of
their total wealth by adjusting their nancial portfolio.
The distribution of consumption (normalized by income) is shown in the mid-
dle panel of Figure 1. The median consumption level is relatively at over the life
cycle, but uncertainty in old-age consumption is increasing with time. In the OI
scheme, the consumption is higher (hence new saving is lower) when the nancial
wealth is boosted by good returns. Finally, the accumulated assets over life cycle
are presented in the lower panel of Figure 1. These asset values show wide dis-
persion and peak at the retirement date. The median amount saved at retirement
is around 11 times of the annual labor income for OI scheme or 13 times for DC
scheme. The above results are based on baseline parameter assumptions. Further
sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and subjective discount rate can
be found in Appendix B.3.
2.4.2 Optimal collective schemes and welfare evaluation
Having described both collectives and individual schemes in previous sections,
Table 2.1 reports the optimal design parameters fp; ; ; !g and the obtained
welfare levels for those schemes under the default parameter values (r = 2%;
 = 4%;    r = 4%,  = 5). It also shows the results under two alternative risk
aversion assumptions ( = 3 and  = 8). All schemes are initially fully funded
(i.e. A0 = L).
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We nd that institutional settings have a signicant impact on the optimal
contribution rates and investment policies. The target level of contribution p and
portfolio choice ! vary signicantly across schemes. The optimal contribution rate
in DC scheme is the lowest of all, which is 11%. The optimal target contribution
rate in DBCA scheme is the highest, requiring 16.6% of annual salary. This leads
to the highest risk-free replacement rate of 78.4% after retirement. The desired
contribution rate in DBBA scheme is the lowest among the collective schemes,
requiring 13.1% of salary, which is close to the DC scheme. Consequently, its
target replacement rate b is also the lowest at 53.6%. The hybrid scheme DBH
requires 14% of salary as contribution rate and leads to a 66% target replacement
rate. The actual contributions and benets are di¤erent from these risk-free levels,
as the pension fund can run surpluses or decits.
The portfolio choice ofDBBA scheme is less aggressive than the other collective
schemes. The risky portfolio weight of DBBA scheme is 60%, whereas the risky
share of DBCA scheme reaches 96%. The hybrid scheme DBH accommodates the
most aggressive investment portfolio, namely 100% in stocks. Comparing with
the portfolio choices in the optimal individual schemes (Figure 1), where the stock
portfolio share declines to 35% over the life cycle, the stock allocations of col-
lective schemes are much higher. This shows that intergenerational risk sharing
makes an aggressive investment policy more attractive. Due to intergenerational
risk sharing, participants are more capable to exploit the positive equity premi-
ums. This nding conrms the results of Gollier (2008) that intergenerational risk
sharing increases the demand for risky investment. The values of the contribution
and benet adjustment parameters  and  are typically small, indicating that
funding mismatches are absorbed gradually over time.
Figure 3 provides some graphical insight in the distribution of consumption
over time. The gure plots the 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles of the normalized
consumption, ct, of the optimal collective plans, with the scheme parameters set
corresponding to Table 2.1 with  = 5. In general, the consumption proles are
upward sloping with age. The distributions of consumption indicate that contri-
bution reductions are more frequent, and also larger, than contribution increases.
This is due to the positive equity premium. The gure shows that the hybrid
scheme (DBH) is much better in distributing shocks over the full lifetime of the
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individual than the other collective schemes, where there are large uctuations in
consumption either just before retirement (DBCA) or during the retirement pe-
riod (DBBA). This demonstrates that more e¢cient risk sharing can be achieved
by using more risk absorbers. Through adjusting both contribution and benet
policies, the DBH scheme spreads the funding residual over both workers and
retirees, i.e. all cohorts are involved in the risk sharing. From the risk allocation
perspective, DBCA and DBBA represent two extremes, with one group of people
bearing all risks, while the other group is fully insured. The hybrid scheme allo-
cates the risks more e¢ciently among all generations, hence reducing the costs of
risk taking and resulting in welfare improvements.5
The most important result in Table 2.1 is the welfare levels of the optimized
pension schemes from the entry cohort perspective. Welfare level is reported as
the normalized certainty equivalent consumption in units of annual salary, CEC.
Let CECOI denote the welfare level achieved by the optimal individual scheme
(OI). The ratio CEC=CECOI then shows the welfare of the collective schemes
relative to this optimal individual benchmark. For participants with a default risk
aversion ( = 5), the hybrid dened benet (DBH) scheme provides a welfare
gain of 2.3% per annum vis-a-vis the OI scheme in terms of certainty equivalent
consumption. Over the full life-cycle, this amounts to more than one annual
salary gain. The results indicate that well-structured intergenerational risk sharing
is welfare enhancing compared to the optimal individual scheme. Despite the
fact that adjustment speed coe¢cients and asset allocation are xed, the hybrid
collective scheme still outperforms the individual benchmark. The hybrid pension
plan with exibility in adjusting both contribution and benet levels to absorb
funding residue are the most preferred in welfare terms. It outperforms other
collective plans that only allow for adjustments in either contributions or benet
levels. Particularly, the DBCA scheme has a welfare loss of 0.3% relative to the
optimal individual scheme, whereas the DBBA scheme shows a welfare loss of
2.7%. Notice that the welfare of the DBBA scheme is very close to the welfare of
its individual counterpart, theDC plan. As theDC scheme induces a 2.8% welfare
5This nding conrms the results of Van Hemert (2005), who shows that the optimal inter-
generational risk sharing in social security program is neither a pure dened benet type nor a
dened contribution type, but a state contingent hybrid scheme.
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loss vis-a-vis the OI scheme, the hybrid dened benet scheme outperforms the
more realistic DC scheme by 36% per annum.
Furthermore, in Section 2.5.1, we will show that the market value of contri-
butions equals the market value of benets in the optimal collective schemes. It
means that the contributions and benets set according to Equation (2.6) and the
risk sharing rules in Equations (2.12) and (2.13) are actuarially fair. Ex ante, the
starting generation does not borrow from future generations and therefore there
is no "chocolate paradox" of the type described by Shell (1971). More details of
the discussion is postponed till Section 2.5.1.
2.4.3 Welfare of older and future generations
We have shown in the previous subsection that the entry cohort is better o¤ by
starting with an optimal DBH scheme at time 0. What about the welfare of the
coexisting older generations (from age 26 to age 78)? Are they better o¤ or worse
o¤ by switching to the optimal DBH scheme as compared with switching to OI
schemes at time 0 with accumulated assets equal to the value of their accumulated
liabilities? Figure 4 compares the welfare levels of the living older generations
under the optimalDBH scheme, with what would be achieved under the OI scheme
if the older generations switch to their own OI schemes, WOIx;t=0 = Lx. The welfare
of older generations is dened as the CEC of x-year-old under the given optimal













; for x=26,...,78 (2.23)
Figure 4 shows that the welfare levels of the older generations are higher than (or
indistinguishable from) what would be obtained under the OI scheme, if they had
switched at time 0. Therefore the welfare gain the entry cohort does not cause a
welfare loss for the living older generations.
The question whether or not the welfare gain of the current new-entry cohort
comes at the expense of the future cohorts is an important issue for pension plan
design. To investigate this question, we compute the ex ante expected welfare of
the future cohorts, who will join the optimal collective schemes described as in
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Table 2.1, with the initial condition that the pension funds are fully funded at
t = 0. We calculate the certainty equivalent consumption, CECf , of the future
cohorts (the future 25-year-olds) who will enter into the pension fund in f years
time, with f = 0; 1; 2; :::; 1000 years. The expected welfare of cohort f obtained
from participating a given pension scheme, during his life time from year f till


















Table 2.2 presents the CEC of the future cohorts (up to cohort f = 1000) relative
to that of the optimal individual scheme, CECf=CECOI , which can be seen as the
relative welfare gain or loss over the individual benchmark. The expected welfare
of all future cohorts are higher than the time 0 entry cohort. Figure 5 (upper
panel) visualizes the welfare improvements including the 1000 future cohort. The
welfare is steadily increasing for future cohorts and converging to a level much
above the level for the entry cohort.
From this result we can conclude that the expected welfare gain of the current
entry cohort is not at the cost of the future cohorts from an ex ante perspective.
Although optimization occurs by the entering generation, the fund is expected to
build up a bu¤er, and is, in expectation, over-funded in the long run, as shown in
Figure 5 (lower panel). Due to these transfers, future cohorts are able to benet
from the positive equity premium before they are born. Intergenerational risk
sharing together with asset accumulations greatly enhance the intertemporal risk
smoothing capability of the economy with collective pension schemes.
2.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We now perform some robustness checks to see if our results still hold under dif-
ferent risk and time preferences, and with a reduced equity premium. The degree
of risk aversion has several e¤ects on the optimal pension design, as shown in
Table 2.1. Comparing the results as the coe¢cient of risk aversion increases from
 = 3 to  = 8, one observes three changes: (i) the portfolios become less risky,
(ii) the contribution rates increase, and (iii) the schemes rely more on intergen-
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erational risk sharing by choosing lower values for  and/or . Furthermore, the
degree of risk aversion a¤ects the welfare gain from intergenerational risk sharing.
The welfare gain for a less risk averse investor ( = 3) is 3.9% in the DBH scheme,
whereas it is reduced to 0.9% for a more risk averse investor ( = 8). The result
that more risk-averse agent obtains less welfare gain may seem counter-intuitive
at rst sight, but observe that the less risk-averse agent is willing to accept a more
risky portfolio and thus benets more from intergenerational risk sharing. The
less risk averse participants are also willing to accept larger adjustments in con-
tributions and benets in order to absorb funding mismatches, which is reected
in higher values for  and .
Table 2.3 shows the optimal schemes and the welfare evaluations when the
equity premium is reduced from 4% to 3%. The results are in line with our
baseline results reported in Table 2.1, supporting our claim that well-organized
IRS by collective pension funds is welfare improving. However the welfare levels
are lower and the relative welfare gains are smaller. For instance, the welfare
gain for participants in DBH scheme vis-à-vis the OI scheme ranges now from
0% to 2%, depending on the degree of risk aversion, and 2% to 4% vis-à-vis the
DC scheme. A lower subjective discount factor results in higher contribution
rates, similar to the individual schemes. However, other design parameters are
not signicantly di¤erent from the baseline cases.
2.5 Sustainability
Having shown that IRS in collective pension plans can be welfare improving with
mandatory participation and renegotiation-proof, we investigate in this section
several issues related to the sustainability of the pension schemes. Sustainability
may be at stake when new cohorts are reluctant to step into the pension plan
because of underfunding. In this section we therefore consider the market value of
the pension deals, the distribution of the funding ratio and possible social planners
designs (which takes future generations into account).
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2.5.1 Market valuation of the pension schemes
In this section, we focus on the market values of contributions and benets in
the optimal collective schemes. For an individual member, it may be di¢cult to
trade his pension claims once he stepped into a pension contract, but a market
valuation is useful ex-ante to evaluate a given pension deal. Furthermore, it is
important to investigate whether the target contributions and benets set accord-
ing to Equation (2.6) and the risk sharing rules in Equations (2.12) and (2.13)
are actuarially fair. If so, then it means the market value of contributions equals
the market value of benets, and ex ante, the starting generation does not borrow
from future generations and therefore there is no "chocolate paradox" of the type
described by Shell (1971).
From the perspective of a new pension fund member, the market value of the
pension deal is the value of the actual benets minus the contributions. We take all
the (stochastic) cash ows (pt; bt) generated by the optimal pension schemes and
value them using the deator method.6 For the typical member with retirement
date R and life expectancy T , the net present value (NPV) of the pension deal is
the di¤erence between the present value of benets (PV B) and the present value
of contributions (PV P )











where pt and bt are the (stochastic) actual contributions paid and benets received.
From an ex-ante point of view, the pension scheme is a fair deal if the NPV is zero.
Figure 2 shows quantile plots of the normalized funding ratios, FRt = St=L, of
the three optimal collective schemes. Funding surpluses are more frequent (and
larger in size) than funding decits. This is due to the positive equity premium.
However, this does not add value to the pension deal: the lower contributions
occur in scenarios where the equity returns are high, but the deators in such
scenarios are low. Therefore, the present values of the paid contributions and the
cost-price contributions are equal.
6This analysis builds on Bader and Gold (2002), Blake (1998), Chapman et al. (2001) and De
Jong (2007), and results in the method of value-based generational accounting of Ponds (2003).
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The collective schemes may shift the funding mismatches beyond ones life
time, leaving surplus or decit in the notional cohort account. An alternative
way of calculating the present value of pension deals therefore is to look at the
remaining balance left in the notional cohort account at the end of life of a cohort.
A positive remaining balance indicates positive transfers from this generation to
other cohorts. Similarly, a negative transfer means the cohort receives cash ows
from other cohorts. In a collective pension scheme, any cohort writes a call option
to share a funding surplus with the other cohorts, and holds a protective put option
to receive protections from the other cohorts. When the value of the call equals the
value of the put, the pension deal is a fair deal in value terms ex ante. Formally,
let at denote the accumulated asset in the notional cohort account through out
their life time (0  t  T ). Each cohort starts its notional account with no surplus
or decit, i.e. a0 = 0. The dynamics of the cohort account are
dat = [at (r + ! (  r)) + pt   bt] dt+ !atdZt (2.26)
Integrating out this dynamics and applying Equation (2.25), the NPV of the pen-
sion deal can be decomposed as the sum of the value of the call and the put option,
valuing the positive and negative transfers to other cohorts:








Table 2.4 summarizes the market valuation of the intergenerational transfers
and options for initially fully funded pension schemes (FR0 = 1). As required
by the assumption of actuarial fairness, the NPV is indeed zero for all collec-
tive schemes. However, the market values of positive and negative transfers (the
implicit call and put options) are potentially large, between 0.2 to 1.25 annual
salaries, indicating a substantial amount of ex post transfers. The magnitude of
the transfers depend on the chosen asset mix, the level of contributions and the
risk sharing rules. The DBCA scheme results in the highest value of transfers
whereas the DBBA scheme results in the lowest value of transfers. This makes the
DBCA system less sustainable than the DBBA system, as future generations can
be confronted with larger decits in the pension fund.
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2.5.2 Initially underfunded and overfunded schemes
The distributions of the funding status over time are critical for the welfare of
the future cohorts and the sustainability of the schemes. Seriously underfunded
situations are di¢cult for the sustainability of the fund, as in these situations
future generations may want to step out.
Table 2.5 shows the welfare gains and losses of entering the initially over-
and underfunded schemes (with funding ratios being FR0 = 1:1; FR0 = 0:9
and FR0 = 0:8 respectively). These schemes are set at their optimal designs as in
Table 2.1 (middle panel). The new cohort joining an underfunded collective scheme
is not necessarily worse o¤ in welfare terms, comparing with the optimal individual
benchmark. For instance, when FR0 falls to 0.9 (0.8) initially, the welfare of DBH
is 100.7% (98.8%) of that of the optimal individual scheme. Hence it is possible
for well-structured collective pension schemes to absorb funding decits up to
10% to 20% by intergenerational risk sharing and still enhance the welfare for her
participants.
Table 2.6 shows the market valuation of the intergenerational transfers when
the collective schemes are initially underfunded. The net transfers ex ante are non-
zero. The net transfers are large and positive, meaning the entry cohort makes up
a large part of the initial decits, by either higher contributions (DBCA, DBH) or
lower benets (DBBA, DBH). Furthermore, the net transfers are proportional to
the degree of underfunding. For instance, the value of net transfers doubles when
FR0 is reduced from 0.9 to 0.8. Initially overfunded schemes are also reported in
Table 2.5 and 2.6. The market values of the net transfers starting with FR0 = 1:1
are mirror images of FR0 = 0:9.
2.5.3 Social planners view
An alternative way to design the collective schemes is to take into account the
welfare of future generations by taking a social planners view. Suppose the social
planners objective is to maximize a weighted sum of entry and future cohorts life
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where 0 <  < 1 is the social planners weighting factor for the future cohorts.
There is no clear guidance as to how  should be chosen. Gollier (2008) imposes
that the assets of the pension fund follow a martingale; this assumption implies
 = 0:937, given his other parameter values. We assume the weighting factor
of the social planner is the same as individuals subjective discount factor, hence
 = e  = 0:96.7 We calculate the social planners designs for individuals with
risk aversion of  = 5.
Table 2.7 shows the results for the social planners optimal pension schemes.
Comparing the socially optimal schemes with the schemes optimized for the f = 0
entry cohort in Table 2.1, we see that the values of  and  are slightly lower
and the portfolio choice becomes more risky. These results indicate that shocks
in funding surplus are shared by more generations under the socially optimal
schemes. Table 2.8 shows the market value of the intergenerational transfers under
the socially optimal schemes. Indeed the market value of transfers (calls and
puts) are larger comparing with that of Table 2.4. CECopt shows the certainty
equivalent consumption of the time 0 entry cohort under the scheme optimized
by the social planner. From comparing CECopt with CEC in Table 2.1, we nd
that the welfare of the time 0 entry generation is slightly reduced under the social
planners schemes. Figure 6 compares the welfare improvements of the DBH
scheme under the socially optimal design versus the f = 0 cohort optimal design.
In the short run, the entry cohort optimal scheme dominates, but for cohorts
entering after f = 15 approximately, the socially optimal scheme is better.
These results do not materially change for di¤erent risk and time preferences
or a lower equity premium; the long run welfare gains for the future cohorts are
still substantial.
7Feldstein (2005) provides an argument why a 4% discount rate is a reasonable value.
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2.6 Conclusion
We have used the institutional setting of funded pension schemes to study welfare
aspects of intergenerational risk sharing. Typical for such collective pension plans
is that pension benets and/or pension contributions may depend on the funding
status. From the perspective of a newly entering cohort, we optimize the explicit
asset allocation and risk allocation rules, which specify who of the stakeholders,
when, and to what extent is taking part in risk bearing.
We show that well-designed funded schemes with intergenerational risk sharing
are welfare improving over and above the fully optimal individual scheme by up
to 2-4% in terms of certainty equivalent consumption. The hybrid dened ben-
et scheme (DBH), where risks are shared between working and retired cohorts,
performs better than schemes where risks are only borne by workers (DBCA) or
retirees (DBBA). The initially fully funded collective pension schemes with in-
tergenerational risk sharing are a zero-sum game in value terms, however they
are potentially a positive-sum game in welfare terms. Furthermore, the expected
welfare gain of the current entry cohort is not at the cost of the older and future
cohorts, from an ex ante perspective. This result has important implications for
the current trend of shifting from dened benet to (individual) dened contri-
bution schemes. In such individual schemes, the risks are concentrated mainly in
the retirement phase, giving up the intergenerational risk sharing potential and
the greater intertemporal risk smoothing capacity of collective plans.
Introducing more sources of systematic risks in addition to the modeled in-
vestment risks, like labor income risk and real interest rate risk, might further
strengthen the welfare-enhancing potential of intergenerational risk sharing via
collective schemes compared to the optimal individual scheme.
2.7 Appendix A: Solution method of collective schemes
The optimization problem of collective schemes, Equation (2.14), is a static prob-
lem, since all the decision parameters {p; ; ; !} are constants. The collective
schemes are solved using Monte Carlo simulations and grid search. We rst con-
struct a four dimensional grid for the decision parameters. For each combination of
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the parameters, we simulate the wealth dynamics (2.8) at each point in time, evalu-
ate the resulting funding surplus and determine the state contingent contributions
and benets pt and bt according to the risk sharing rules in Equations (2.12) to
(2.13). When pt and bt are determined, we evaluate the objective function (2.14)
for the new entry cohort. A numerical grid search identies the global maximum
of the welfare function (2.14) and its corresponding parameter values fp; ; ; !g.
2.8 Appendix B: Solution method of individual schemes
2.8.1 OI scheme
This appendix explains the solution procedure solving the optimal individual (OI)
consumption and portfolio choice described in Section 2.4.1. We rst rewrite
the optimization problem (2.15) in discrete time form (at annual frequency), and
rewrite the original objective function in the recursive form as follows











+ 1 (1  t < R) (2.30)






(R  t < T ) (2.31)









; and Rf = exp (r).
The problem is solved using dynamic programming principle, solving backwards
from the last to the rst period.
For the nal period, the optimal consumption cT = WT ; and the functional





1  : Then, we proceed
backward in time to t = T   1. The procedure for T   1 starts by dening a new
variable at =Wt   ct; as the after-consumption-wealth. Following Carroll (2006),
we construct a grid of at = fajgJj=1: Now we solve for the optimal consumption
and portfolio policies for each given aj . The rst order conditions with respect to
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The envelope theorem implies that u0 (ct) = U
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where ct+1[Wt+1] as the optimal consumption policy at time t + 1, and Iu () de-
notes the inverse function of u0 (ct) : Using any numerical solver, Equation (3.31)
will give the optimal portfolio weight !t (at) for any given amount of investment
at. Because of the borrowing and short-selling constraints, we then impose the re-
striction 0  !t  1. Then, Equation (3.32) gives the corresponding consumption
ct (at) for any given amount of investment at. Finally, the optimal wealth process
is endogenously determined by W t = c

t (at) + at: The advantage of this method
is that the numerical search is only needed once in solving !t (at), while c

t (at)
can be directly obtained from Equation (3.32).
Following the same procedure illustrated above, we can solve the model back-
ward in time to t = 1. To generate the average pattern of life cycle portfolio
holding we simulate the model from time 1 to T for 10,000 scenarios, and take
the average over all simulated scenarios.
2.8.2 DC scheme
The optimal consumption and portfolio choice after retirement in the DC scheme
is identical to the one in the OI scheme. Before retirement, the optimal port-
folio weight !t is stochastic, depending on the relative size of nancial capital
and human capital. Campbell and Viceira (2002) show that the optimal individ-
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WDCt + PV Ct
WDCt
(2.37)
where PV Ct denotes the present value of the future pension contributions, as a
fraction of the investors human capital,




Since the investor is borrowing and short sales constrained, the optimal portfolio
is then given by: !t = min(max(0; !

t ); 1). The optimal contribution rate m is
found by numerical search, given the optimal portfolio strategy.
2.8.3 Sensitivity analysis
The degree of risk aversion has a major impact on the portfolio choice. Figure B3
(upper panel) displays the average life cycle portfolio proles for investors with
di¤erent risk aversion  = 3; 5; 8: Less risk averse investor allocates more assets
in equities. The degree of risk aversion has only a minor impact on consumption
and asset accumulation proles, via the di¤erent portfolio choices. The more risk
averse individuals save more and consume less compared with the less risk averse
individuals. Figure B3 (lower panel) also shows the average life cycle consump-
tion proles for investors with di¤erent subjective discount rate  = 4%, 2%, and
0%. The subjective discount rate has a strong impact on consumption proles.
In general, from the rst order condition for optimality (Equation 2.33 in the ap-
pendix) it follows that the expected consumption is increasing when the expected
portfolio return is larger than the subjective discount rate. The gures show that
for  = 4%, the median consumption prole is fairly at. For lower values of 
the median consumption is increasing with age. The subjective discount rate has
only a minor impact on the portfolio choice, via the changes in total-wealth to
nancial wealth ratio.
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Figure B3: The impacts of di¤erent risk aversion and subjective dis-
count rates on individual schemes.
Varying the degree of risk aversion among  = 3; 5; and 8, while keeping
other parameters at their default values, (a) shows the median of portfolio weight
distribution in the OI scheme over ones life cycle, and (b) shows the median of
portfolio weights distribution in the DC scheme. Varying the subjective discount
rate among  = 4%; 2%; and 0%, while keeping other parameters at their default
values, (c) shows the median of consumption distribution in the OI scheme, and
(d) shows the median of consumption distribution in the OI scheme.
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Table 2.1: Optimal pension schemes
The table shows the optimal pension scheme parameters under the default val-
ues for the time preference ( = 4%) and equity premium (   r = 4%). The
optimal contribution rate and the corresponding replacement ratio are given by
(p; b). The optimal speed of risk absorbing by adjusting contributions or benets
is determined by (; ) respectively. The optimal portfolio weight in equities is
given by (!). The welfare levels achieved under these optimal collective schemes
are indicated by CEC (in units of annual salary). The ratio CEC=CECOI shows
the relative welfare gain or loss of the collective schemes relative to the optimal
individual scheme (OI).
 OI DC DBCA DBBA DBH
3 CEC 0.908 0.886 0.926 0.886 0.943
CEC=CECOI 100% 97.6% 102.0% 97.6% 103.9%
(p; b) - 11.0% 16.6%,78.4% 11.4%,53.6% 14.0%,66%
 - - 0.07 - 0.06
 - - - 0.03 0.02
! - - 100% 94% 100%
5 CEC 0.892 0.867 0.889 0.867 0.912
CEC=CECOI 100% 97.2% 99.7% 97.2% 102.3%
(p; b) - 12.8% 16.6%,78.4% 13.1%,53.6% 14.0%,66%
 - - 0.05 - 0.045
 - - - 0.03 0.02
! - - 96% 60% 100%
8 CEC 0.876 0.854 0.865 0.853 0.888
CEC=CECOI 100% 97.7% 98.7% 97.3% 100.9%
(p; b) - 14.1% 17.5%,82.5% 14.0%,66% 15.7%,74.4%
 - - 0.04 - 0.04
 - - - 0.02 0.02
! - - 67% 55% 76%
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Table 2.2: Welfare of the future generations
This table reports the welfare improvements CECf=CECOI of the future gen-
erations who enter the optimal schemes (as in Table 2.1) in f years time. Risk
aversion equals  = 5. The benchmark for this welfare comparison is set at the op-
timal individual scheme, OI. The future time of entering into the pension schemes
is denoted by f .
f = 0 f = 2 f = 5 f = 10 f = 30 f = 100 f = 1000
DBCA 99.7% 100.2% 101.7% 104.2% 112.3% 129.6% 149.5%
DBBA 97.2% 97.3% 97.5% 97.8% 98.7% 100.7% 101.1%
DBH 102.3% 102.8% 104.3% 106.6% 114.1% 126.7% 137.2%
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Table 2.3: Optimal pension schemes with lower equity premium
The table shows the optimal pension scheme parameters for a reduced equity
premium (   r = 3%). The optimal contribution rate and the corresponding
replacement ratio are given by (p; b). The optimal speed of risk absorbing by
adjusting contributions or benets is determined by (; ) respectively. The opti-
mal portfolio weight in equities is given by (!). The welfare levels achieved under
these optimal collective schemes are indicated by CEC (in units of annual salary).
The ratio CEC=CECOI shows the relative welfare gain or loss of the collective
schemes to the optimal individual scheme (OI).
 OI DC DBCA DBBA DBH
3 CEC 0.882 0.863 0.886 0.865 0.899
CEC=CECOI 100% 97.7% 100.5% 97.8% 101.9%
(p; b) - 12.4% 16.1%,76% 12.2%,57.6% 14.3%,67.2%
 - - 0.08 - 0.055
 - - - 0.03 0.025
! - - 92% 76% 95%
5 CEC 0.869 0.852 0.864 0.850 0.876
CEC=CECOI 100% 97.9% 99.4% 97.8% 100.8%
(p; b) - 14% 17.5%,82.5% 14%,66% 14.3%,67.6%
 - - 0.065 - 0.055
 - - - 0.025 0.02
! - - 62% 50% 88%
8 CEC 0.859 0.842 0.846 0.842 0.860
CEC=CECOI 100% 98.0% 98.5% 98.0% 100.1%
(p; b) - 15% 18.9%,88.8% 14.8%,70% 15.7%,74%
 - - 0.05 - 0.05
 - - - 0.02 0.02
! - - 45% 40% 62%
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Table 2.4: Market value of intergenerational transfers
This table reports the market value of the actual contributions (PV P ) and ben-
ets (PV B) for a new entry cohort and an initially fully funded pension scheme
(FR0 = 1). The market value of the intergenerational transfers are shown in
columns call ( for positive transfers) and put (for negative transfers), as dened
in equation (2.27). All scheme parameters are set at the scheme-specic optimal
levels as in Table 2.1 for  = 5. The market values are expressed in terms of
multiples of annual salary.
 = 5 p PV P PV B call put
DBCA 16.6% 4.62 4.61 1.26 1.25
DBBA 13.1% 3.64 3.64 0.22 0.22
DBH 14.0% 3.89 3.88 0.77 0.77
Table 2.5: Welfare evaluation of initially overfunded and underfunded
schemes
FR0 denotes the initial funding ratio. The optimal scheme designs are as shown
in Table 2.1 for  = 5. CEC=CECOI shows the relative welfare gain or loss to
the optimal individual scheme.
OI DC DBCA DBBA DBH
FR0 = 1:1
CEC 0.892 0.867 0.909 0.871 0.928
CEC=CECOI 100% 97.2% 101.9% 97.5% 104.0%
FR0 = 0:9
CEC - - 0.867 0.862 0.896
CEC=CECOI - - 97.4% 96.8% 100.7%
FR0 = 0:8
CEC - - 0.845 0.856 0.881
CEC=CECOI - - 94.8% 96% 98.8%
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Table 2.6: Market valuation of initially underfunded and overfunded
schemes
This table reports the market value of the actual contributions (PV P ) and benets
(PV B) of the intergenerational transfers when the collective schemes are initially
underfunded (FR0 = 0:8, FR0 = 0:9) or overfunded (FR0 = 1:1). The schemes
parameters are set according to Table 2.1,  = 5. The market values are expressed
in terms of multiples of annual salary.
 = 5 p PV P PV B call put NPV
FR0 = 1:1
DBCA 16.6% 4.05 4.61 1.02 1.58 0.56
DBBA 13.1% 3.64 3.79 0.15 0.30 0.15
DBH 14.0% 3.55 3.91 0.62 0.98 0.36
FR0 = 0:9
DBCA 16.6% 5.16 4.61 1.53 0.98 -0.55
DBBA 13.1% 3.64 3.50 0.31 0.16 -0.15
DBH 14.0% 4.21 3.86 0.94 0.60 -0.35
FR0 = 0:8
DBCA 16.6% 5.71 4.61 1.75 0.65 -1.10
DBBA 13.1% 3.64 3.35 0.42 0.12 -0.30
DBH 14.0% 4.53 3.84 1.14 0.45 -0.70
Table 2.7: Welfare of socially optimal collective schemes
This table shows the social planners optimal designs with weighting factor M=
 = 0:96 and risk aversion  = 5. CECopt is the certainty equivalent consumption
of the time 0 entry cohort under the optimal schemes chosen by the social planner.
DBCA DBBA DBH
CECopt=CECOI 98.7% 96.4 101.8%
(p; b) 19.2%,90.7% 14%,66% 15.7%,74.3%
 0.04 - 0.03
 - 0.025 0.01
! 100% 65% 100%
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Table 2.8: Valuation of intergenerational transfers under socially optimal
design
This table reports the market value of the actual contributions, PV P , and benets,
PV B under the social planners optimal designs with the weighting factor M=  =
0:96 and risk aversion  = 5. The market value of the intergenerational transfers
are shown in columns call (positive transfers) and put (negative transfers).
 = 5 p PV P PV B call put
DBCA 19.2% 5.35 5.34 1.46 1.45
DBBA 14% 3.87 3.87 0.3 0.3
DBH 15.7% 4.36 4.35 0.98 0.97
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Figure 1: Life cycle proles of the individual schemes (OI and DC)
Taking a benchmark investor (with  = 5;  = 4%), the following charts
show the life cycle quantile distributions of portfolio weights in equities for the
OI scheme (a) and the DC scheme (b); the life cycle quantile distributions of
consumptions for the OI scheme (c) and the DC scheme (d); and the life cycle
quantile distributions of wealth accumulation for the OI scheme (e) and the DC
scheme (f).
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Figure 2: Funding status of the collective schemes.
The charts below show the (5%, 50%, 95%) quantile distribution of the surplus
ratio, St=L, of the optimal collective schemes (DBCA, DBBA, and DBH). The
scheme parameters are xed at their optimal values as given in Table 2.1 for  = 5:
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Figure 3: Consumption proles obtained from the collective schemes
The charts below show the (5%, 50%, 95%) quantile distribution of consump-
tions in the optimal collective schemes (DBCA, DBBA, and DBH). The scheme
parameters are xed at their optimal values as given in Table 2.1 for  = 5: The
consumption levels are normalized by annual salary, i.e. ct=y.
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Figure 4: Welfare levels of the living older generations
This gure compares welfare levels of the living older generations under the
optimal DBH scheme (blue curve with dots, as in Table 2.1 for  = 5), with what
would be achieved under the OI scheme if the older generations switch to their
own OI schemes (black curve).
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Figure 5: Future generations under the generation-0 optimal schemes.
Consider a future generation f who enters a given collective scheme in f years
time, and the scheme is optimized for the time-0 generation as characterized in
Table 2.1 ( = 5). The upper panel shows the welfare improvements obtained
from entering the given collective schemes (DBCA, DBBA, and DBH) above the
optimal individual benchmark (OI), CECf=CECOI ; for these 1000 future gener-
ations (f = 1; 2; :::; 1000). The lower panel shows the mean and the median of the
surplus ratio (St=L) for the DBH scheme.
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Figure 6: Welfare gain under the socially optimal v.s. under the
generation-0 optimal DBH schemes
This gure compares the welfare gain of the future generations between en-
tering the socially optimal DBH scheme (as in Table 2.7) v.s. the generation-0
optimal DBH scheme (as in Table 2.1 ( = 5)).
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Chapter 3
DC pension plan defaults and
individual welfare
This chapter is based on Cui (2008b).
3.1 Introduction
Individual DC pension schemes o¤er each participant the freedom to choose and
to implement the optimal consumption and investment strategies to their own
needs. Life cycle theory has shown how to determine the optimal saving and
investing strategies. In reality, however, the early experiences with DC schemes
show that most people choose highly suboptimal saving and investment strategies.
A growing body of research shows that most people simply follow the given de-
faults1 (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2004), Beshear, Choi, Laibson, Madrian
(2004), Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), Benartzi, Peleg, and Thaler (2007)). They
show that the default designs have signicant impacts on the participation, con-
tribution and investment outcomes. Choi, et al (2004) reported that, until late
1990s, non-participation was the standard enrollment default, i.e., the individuals
are not enrolled unless one opts in. Under such default, participation rates were
1 If individuals do not take action to choose from the avaiable options, then the default settings
will be applied automatically. The defauls specify whether or not one contributes into the tax-
deferred DC account, the level of contribution rate, and the investment funds in which the
contributions will be invested.
50 DC pension plan defaults and individual welfare
low, ranging from 26-43% six month after hiring, and 57-69% three years after
hiring. Since late 1990s, automatic enrollment started to be implemented in DC
plans. Consequently, the reported participation rates exceeded 85% regardless
of the tenure of the employee under automatic enrollment regime. Furthermore,
65%-87% of the participants adopted the default contribution rate of 3% or 4% of
income, and the default investment in money market accounts. About 45% of the
participants still stuck with these defaults three years later. Clearly, the default
design has signicant impact on retirement saving behavior.
Given the dramatic impact of defaults, naturally, we want the defaults to
be as good as possible. Therefore, we ask the question: is the current popular
default design the best possible design in welfare terms? If not, can we design
a better default which may achieve a nearly optimal welfare outcome? To this
end, the goal of this study is to nd the optimal age-dependent contribution and
investment rules, and to evaluate to what extent these default rules help to improve
the individual welfare. We nd, indeed, potentially large economic welfare gains
by following the age-dependent defaults above the current standard default design.
According to PSCAs Automatic Enrollment 2001 Survey2 in the United States,
the most common default contribution rate is 3% or 4% of pay (present in more
than 60% of 401(k) plans). The most common investment default is stable value
fund and money market fund (present in 67% of plans). In this paper, the current
default design refers to automatic enrollment with at contribution rate of 4% of
income, together with a risk free investment vehicle.
The life cycle theory is a very useful framework for such analysis, and it pro-
vides us many insights3. There are two controls in the life cycle planning prob-
lems, namely the optimal consumption and portfolio choices. Both strategies may
depend on ones age, income, wealth accumulation and other economic state vari-
2www.psca.org
3The life cycle theory has a long in nance literature. Particularly, Merton (1969, 1971),
emphasizes on the role of human capital. Some of the more recent papers are Carroll (1992,
1994, 1997) on precautionary saving, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) on life cycle consumption,
Viceira (2001), Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) on life
cycle portfolio choice, Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) on life cycle strategies with
cointegrated labor income with market returns, Cocco (2005) on portfolio choice in the presence
of housing risk, and Gomes, Kotliko¤ and Viceira (2008) on life cycle investing with exible labor
supply.
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ables, and hence may di¤er by age and economic circumstances. A better default
design thus should have two aspects, namely a better saving rate default and a bet-
ter investment default. Several studies propose the so-called life-cycle funds as the
portfolio allocation default (Bodie, McLeavey and Siegel (2007), Viceira (2007)).
The idea of life-cycle funds is to mimic the theoretical life cycle portfolio strategies
using an age-dependent portfolio rebalancing rule. In such life-cycle funds (also
known as target maturity funds) the portfolio allocation to stock mutual funds
declines as one ages, and is replaced gradually by safer assets like bonds and cash.
In fact, the life cycle funds implement a simplied version of the optimal portfolio
strategy. Life-cycle funds recently started to be implemented as the default by
many DC scheme providers, and are expected to have large impact on the asset
allocation outcome of most DC contributors in the future.
However, only changing the portfolio default alone does not help much if peo-
ple do not contribute or fail to contribute enough. To address this pressing issue,
recently, the United States passed the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which
encourages the adoption of several autosave features in the DC plans. These
autosave features include automatic enrollment, employer contribution, contri-
bution escalation, and qualied investment default (see Beshears, Choi, Laibson,
Madrian, and Weller (2008)). The contribution escalation is based on an interest-
ing idea called Save More Tomorrow, which dramatically stimulates participants
to save more (Thaler and Benartzi (2004)). In such a scheme, participants agree
to automatically increase their saving rate whenever they receive a raise. However,
as the authors claim, this design is solely based on behavior motivations, but not
on nancial or economic considerations. Are increased saving rates optimal or
nearly optimal over life cycle? These questions are not addressed in the literature.
Life-cycle funds have tackled the asset allocation aspect of the life cycle theory
but not the consumption aspect. Therefore, the next step forward is to extend the
xed contribution rate to include some age-dependent features. The main idea in
this paper is to design simple default rules for DC contribution and investment to
mimic the optimal consumption during ones life cycle. In addition, we evaluate
to what extent these age dependent default contribution and investment rules
are benecial to the participants and can be recommended as default options for
individual pension plans.
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Our main ndings are the following. First, we nd large economic welfare
gains by following the smart but simple age-dependent contribution rule above
the current standard default design. Comparing to the current defaults, the age
dependent defaults lead to 7.2% increase of the certainty equivalent consumption
per year. Over 60 years (in adulthood), the welfare gain amounts to 2.78 times rst
year labor income. Using the fully optimal strategies as welfare benchmark, the
current default design delivers maximally 92.7% of welfare relative to the optimal
welfare level. Whereas, the age-dependent contribution and investment default
design delivers more than 99% relative to the optimal welfare level. Therefore,
the simple age-dependent contribution and investment rules can achieve nearly
optimal welfare level.
Second, we nd that the contribution (or saving) choice has larger impact
on welfare than the portfolio choice does. As compared to the current defaults
(with at contribution rate of 4% and fully risk free investment), improving the
contribution policy alone increases welfare from 92.7% to 97.1% of the optimal
welfare level. However, improving the asset allocation alone only increases welfare
from 92.7% to 95.2%. Here we show that setting the contribution (or saving)
right is more important in welfare terms. The life cycle literature has been mainly
focusing on the portfolio choices. However, we nd the contribution rule plays a
more important role in improving welfare.
Where does the welfare improvement come from? Our analyses reveal that it
comes from a better trade-o¤ between liquidity constraints and tax advantages.
Early in life, individuals face liquidity constraints, because wage earnings are on
average upward sloping over life time, but individuals cannot borrow against their
future labor income to boost their consumption early in life. In addition, in data
as well in our model setup, the housing expenditure is relatively high for the
young than for the old, which make the liquidity constraint more binding for the
young. On top of these, borrowing or early withdrawal from DC pension scheme
is not allowed unless under severe circumstances and subject to high penalty costs
(about 10% reduction). Therefore DC scheme is (nearly) illiquid during the whole
working period4, which makes the liquidity constraint more severe, especially early
4 In the baseline model of this paper, we assume that borrowing or early withdrawal from the
DC savings are not allowed.
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in life. However, retirement saving through DC scheme is entitled to tax benets
(and often employer matches). As will be clear in the paper, tax benets are
higher as one ages. Thus, the age-dependent DC contribution rule avoids early
periods when liquidity constraint is tight and tax benet is low, but make best
use of the later periods when liquidity is abundant and tax benet is high.
Furthermore,we stress the idea of integrated retirement saving strategies, where
retirement provision is considered jointly with important expenditures like hous-
ing and medicare. Therefore, we carefully model the dynamics and uncertainties
of labor income, housing and medical expenditures, in order to realistically quan-
tify and evaluate the default designs. As we will see that the decreasing life-cycle
pattern of housing expenditures postpones DC savings in the beginning, but the
increasing medical expenditures towards the end of life promotes retirement sav-
ings.
A closely related paper by Gomes, Michaelides and Polkovnichenko (2008)
study the optimal portfolio choices and optimal saving strategies for rational in-
dividuals with a taxable account and a tax-deferred DC account.5 Their focus is
to match the calibrated life-cycle model with the empirical patterns in portfolio
choice, wealth accumulation and stock market participation in the two accounts
setting. This paper adapts a similar modeling setup as Gomes et al (2006), but
with a focus on the optimal age-dependent contribution and investment rules.
Gomes, Kotliko¤ and Viceira (2008) also study the welfare comparisons of simple
defaults. However they only consider defaults for portfolio choice.
The classical life cycle models with single account is inadequate for studying
contribution rules. Therefore, the setting with two accounts is particularly impor-
tant to capture the liquidity constraint when designing the contribution rules. In
this paper, we explicitly model the liquid taxable account and illiquid tax-deferred
DC plans. Under the two-account setting, we rst illustrate the optimal contri-
bution and investment policies. Then, we show various default designs, including
constant and age-dependent features. We use the dynamic programming and the
Endogenous-Grid Method (Carroll, 2006, 2007) to solve the extended life cycle
5Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) also study the optimal portfolio choices with taxable and
tax-deferred accounts. They focus on the portfolio choices in taxable and tax-deferred accounts
due to di¤erent tax treatment on dividends, capital gains and interests.
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model with two accounts.
The organization of the paper is the follows. Section 2 explains the model setup
and the economic environment. Section 3 solves the life cycle model to describe
the optimal life cycle saving and investment strategies in an ideal world. There
we see several age related patterns regarding the asset allocation and consump-
tion strategies over life time. In Section 4, we study the age-dependent default
designs for passive participants in individual-based DC schemes. We focus on the
e¤ect of age-dependent designs of contribution and investment defaults, and to see
how far one can push the welfare closer to the optimal strategies by using these
age-dependent defaults. Section 5 presents the welfare comparisons and policy
implications, and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
3.2.1 Individuals preferences
We assume that all individuals start working at age 25 (t = 0) and retire at 65 (R =
40). For simplicity, we assume that the individuals die at age 85 (T = 60). During
the working period (1  t  R) the individuals earn stochastic labor income,
denoted by Yt. During the retirement period (R  t  T ), the individuals receive
no income but consume their accumulated wealth, denoted by Wt. Individuals
derive utility over single consumption goods (normalized by price ination). An









where  is the risk aversion parameter and  is the subjective discount factor. In
the baseline model, we x  = 5; and  = 0:97; following the life cycle literature.
3.2.2 Return dynamics
There are two nancial assets traded in the market, one risk free and one risky
(both in real terms). The real risk free asset o¤ers a xed real interest rate r. The
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real price of the risky stock index, Et, follows geometric Brownian motion with
a constant drift. Dividends are reinvested. The aggregate real wage index Gt is
stochastic. The uncertain stock returns are potentially correlated with stochastic
aggregate wage growth. This contemporaneous correlation is denoted by ; where
dZE;t and dZg;t denote the independent Brownian incremental of stock returns and
aggregate wage growth rates. The stock return and wage growth rate dynamics
are the following
dEt=Et = dt+ E
p
1  2dZE;t + EdZg;t (3.1)
dGt=Gt = gdt+ gdZg;t (3.2)
where  and g are the instantaneous drifts, and E and g are the volatilities of
stock returns and wage growth respectively. In the baseline model, we assume
 = 6%; E = 15%; g = 0:8%; and g = 4% annualized.
3.2.3 Labor income and social security
Let t denotes calendar year and t0 the year of birth, so that t  t0 is the age of the
individual under consideration. Following Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Gold-
stein (2007), we assume that the individuals real labor income Yt t0 = GtNt t0
can be decomposed into two component, an aggregate wage component, Gt, and
an age-dependent idiosyncratic component Nt t0 : The growth rate of aggregate
wage component is determined according to eq(3.2).6 While the idiosyncratic wage
component, N; has an age-dependent drift f(t   t0) to generate the hump-shape
of earnings and normally distributed permanent shocks. The real labor income
process is specied as follows
6The aggregate wage growth and equity returns are cointegrated in Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne,
and Goldstein (2007), hence the asset allocation to equities may be reduced due to the cointe-
gration e¤ect. Given the focus of this paper on the age-dependent contribution policy rule, we
asset the aggregate wage rates and equity returns are correlated, but no cointegrated.
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Yt t0 = GtNt t0 (3.3)
lnNt t0 = lnNt 1 t0 + f(t  t0) + nt (3.4)
= lnNt 1 t0 + (a0 + a1 (t  t0)) + nt (3.5)
where t  i:i:d:N (0; 1) : The starting annual salary at age 25, N25; is normalized
to $20,000. The parameter a0 and a1 are set according to the calibration of
Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) for the high education group (a0 =
0.066 and a1= -0.0024), and n = 8%. Figure 1 shows the quantile distributions
of N and G over time.
The old-age social security benet at age 65, SSR, is assumed to be a fraction,
s; of the nal labor income, i.e., SSR = s  YR 1: Each year, the social security is
indexed with the aggregate wage growth, so that SSt = GtSSR; for t > R: In the
baseline model, we consider s = 30%:7
3.2.4 Housing and medical expenditures
From an integrated retirement saving point of view, retirement provisions should
be considered in combination with important expenditures like housing and medicare,
because these expenditures a¤ect when and how much one should save for retire-
ment provisions. As shown in Section 3, the decreasing life-cycle pattern of housing
expenditures postpones DC savings in the beginning, but the increasing medical
expenditures towards the end of life promotes retirement savings. In this paper, we
carefully model the dynamics of housing and out-of-pocket medical expenditures
based on the literatures. Housing expenditures exhibit a decreasing age prole
(Gomes and Michaelides (2005), Amromin, Huang and Sialm (2007)) and medical
expenditures exhibit an increasing age prole (Palumbo (1999), Scholz, Seshadri
and Khitatrakun (2006)). Both expenditures are modeled as exogenous shocks to
the budget process.
We assume that individuals pay o¤ all their mortgages before age 80. The ex-
ogenous housing expenditure represents a fraction of labor income during working
7s = 30% might overstate the benet for the high nal salary individuals, and understate the
benet for the low nal wage individuals.
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period, and a fraction of nal income during the retirement period. Based on the
estimation of Gomes and Michaelides (2005) using PSID data, the ratio of housing
expenditure to income has the following age-dependent mean and variances
Ht=Yt = ht  N
 
h (t) ; 2h (t)

(3.6)
where the age-dependent mean h (age) = h0 + h1  age + h2  age2 + h3  age3;
with h0 = 0:71; h1 =  0:035; h2 = 0:00072; h3 =  0:0000049: Furthermore,
uncertainty in the housing expenditure is captured by h = 2%; and the correlation
between shocks to ht and income Yt is set at -0.5. Figure 2 (left panel) depicts
the average prole and one simulated scenario of the housing expenditures over
life cycle. Housing expenditures are relatively high for the young and the mid-
age households, but relatively low for the retired households when mortgages are
gradually paid o¤.
The medical expenditure also represents a fraction of labor income during
working period, and a fraction of nal income during the retirement period. The
ratio of out-of-pocket medical expenditure to income, following the parameteriza-
tion and estimation results of Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006), is modeled
as follows
ln(Mt=Yt) =  7:316 + 0:012  age+ 0:00066  age2 + "M (3.7)




and M = 20%: Figure 2 (right panel) depicts the average
prole and one simulated scenario of the medical expenditures over life cycle.
Medical expenditures are more costly at advanced ages.
3.2.5 Tax-Deferred Account and Taxable Account
The tax-deferred account is actually an individual-based DC scheme that is pro-
vided by the employer in many countries. Tax advantages, and often additional
employer matching, are used to stimulate savings in the DC schemes. These in-
dividual DC schemes are called the Tax-Deferred Account, since income tax and
dividends tax are exempted or postponed till retirement. In this paper, the DC
contributions are exempted from a higher income tax, y = 30%; withdrawals
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from DC account are taxable at a lower income tax rate,  o = 20%; when retired.
Sometimes, employers will match the contributions made by employees. The em-
ployer matching is a bonus if the employee contributes. The tax deferral and
employer matching provide certain incentives for individuals to save in the tax
deferred DC account. However, to avoid large tax arbitrage, the contribution rate
is capped at 20%, so that maximally 20% of gross income can be contributed in
DC plan in each year. The individuals thus may keep their retirement savings in
these Tax-Deferred Account, and may also hold other private wealth in a Taxable
Account.
3.3 Optimal life cycle strategies
This section studies the optimal life cycle planning problem of an individual with
a tax-deferred account (TDA) and a taxable account (TA), under the realistic
economic settings as in Section 2. Section 3.1. describes the life cycle model for
an individual with tax-deferred DC account and taxable account. Section 3.2.
shows the optimal strategies under the tax benet driven setting (the baseline
model). Section 3.3. presents the results with additional employer matching.
3.3.1 Optimization problem with TDA and TA
The optimization problem with a tax-deferred DC account and a taxable account
is as follows: The Individual optimizes the life time utility by optimally choosing
consumption, contributions into the DC scheme, and the asset allocations in tax-
deferred DC account and taxable account. We focus on when and how much to
contribute into the DC scheme. Let mt denote the contribution rates into the
DC pension plan. We assume that one can not withdraw the DC wealth before
retirement, that is, mt  0 (the contribution rates must be non-negative). In
practice, under severe circumstances early withdrawal from DC account is allowed
(but subject to 10% penalty cost). In the baseline model of this paper, we assume
that borrowing or early withdrawal from the DC savings are not allowed, therefore
DC account is illiquid during the whole working period. The illiquid DC savings
make the liquidity constraint potentially more severe.
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LetW t denote an individuals wealth in the taxable account, andW
DC
t be the
wealth in the tax-deferred DC account. eRet+1 = Et+1=Et denotes the total return
on equities and Rf = exp (r) denotes the real risk free rate. The fractions of assets
invested in equities are denoted by t (for the liquid saving) and 
DC
t (for the DC
account) respectively. Given the focus of this paper on consumption and saving
decisions, we make the simplifying assumption that dividends and capital gains
are not taxed, and further assume the asset allocation in taxable and tax-deferred
DC accounts are identical. The descritized optimization problem with TDA and
















subject to, the wealth dynamics, before retirement (1 t < R), as
W t+1 = (W


















with W 1 = (1  )Y1; and WDC1 = 0 (3.11)
Since the individuals are borrowing constrained, the balances of the two savings
must always be non-negative, as in eq(3.12).
W t  0; WDCt  0 (3.12)
20%  mt  0 (3.13)
After retirement (T  t  R), DC savings become liquid and available for con-
sumption. The individual thus combines the two savings after deducting the in-
come tax paid on the DC wealth, i.e.,WR =W

R+(1   o)WDCR . These combined
wealth are invested in the taxable account to nance the retirement consumption.
Formally, the wealth dynamics of the savings during the retirement period are as
follows.
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Wt+1 =
h
t eRet+1 + (1  t )Rft
i
[Wt   Ct]+ (1   o)SSt+1 Ht+1 Mt+1 (3.14)
Furthermore individuals are short-sales constrained, which implies that
1  t  0 , 1  DCt  0 (3.15)
The problem has no analytical solution due to the portfolio constraints. We use
the dynamic programming principle together with the Endogenous-Grid Method
(Carroll (2006, 2007)) to solve the extended life cycle model with two accounts.
See Appendix A for the details of the solution technique.
3.3.2 The life cycle saving and investing proles
This subsection shows the optimal life cycle proles of the individuals with both
taxable and tax-deferred DC accounts. The distribution of the life cycle proles
are characterized by 5%, 50% 95% quantiles.
Figure 3 (left panel) shows the portfolio allocation in stocks over life time. Re-
call that we assume the asset allocation in Taxable and Tax-deferred DC accounts
are identical. As explained by Campbell and Viceira (2002), due to the leverage
e¤ect of human capital8, the portfolio allocation to equities generally decreases
over time. Here we conrm this nding under the two accounts setting. Figure 3
(right panel) shows the consumption prole, which is slightly increasing over time.
It is due to the no-borrowing constraint and the assumed time preference.
Figure 4 (left panel) shows the contribution rate prole. Strikingly, the young
individuals make zero contribution to the Taxable DC account for the rst ten
years of working period. The contribution rate rapidly increases since the mid-
age, and eventually reaching to 20% ceiling a few years before retirement. Figure
4 (right panel) shows the wealth accumulation in the TA and TDA accounts.
Early in life, young individuals accumulate moderate wealth in taxable account as
precautionary savings against various background risks (incl. income uncertainties
and expenditure uncertainties). The DC wealth starts to grow rapidly after mid-
8The human capital is the present value of the future incomes.
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age, when the individuals are not liquidity constrained, their retirement saving
motives get stronger, and tax benets are much higher. The growth of TDA
account is boosted by transferring wealth from TA to TDA account via higher
contributions around mid-age.
3.3.3 With Employer Matching
Here we consider a variant of the baseline model, including the employer matching.
As reported by Gomes, Michaelides and Polkovnichenko (2008), about half of the
companies do not provide employer matching, and for the other half of the com-
panies who do match employees contributions, the employer matching may take
various form in practice. Here we consider a common practice, i.e., the employer
matches 100% of the employees contribution up to a limit of 6%. However, the
total contribution should not exceed 20%. Let mDCt denote the total contribution
rates into the DC pension plan.
mDCt = min (mt +min (mt; 6%) ; 20%) (3.16)












Figure 5 to 6 show the life cycle proles of portfolio choice, contribution rates,
consumption and wealth accumulations, in the DC scheme with employer match-
ing. Most of the proles are very similar to those in the baseline setup. The main
di¤erence is in the contribution rates prole, Figure 6 (left panel). It exhibits a
clear ladder shape, increasing over life cycle. The contribution rate is zero for
the rst 9 years of working life. The young individuals are liquidity constrained,
because they face relatively low incomes but high housing expenditures. They
leave the employer match on the table. Between age 35 and 45, the contribution
rate increases quickly to 6%, earning the maximal employer matching. After age
45, it increases up to 14%, so that together with the employer matching the total
contribution reaches the 20% ceiling.
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3.3.4 Welfare evaluation
We use the certainty equivalent consumption (CEC) as the welfare measure, which







For easy interpretation, we divide the CEC by the rst gross labor income
Y25: The welfare obtained by implementing the optimal strategies are the follow-
ing. In our baseline model (i.e. no employer matching is provided), the optimal
CEC reaches 0.688 (in units of rst year income). In the variant where employer
matching is o¤ered, the CEC is higher, reaching 0.702 units of rst year income.
The welfare obtained in this section set upper limits for the comparison across
various defaults in the next section.
3.4 Default designs
The previous section discusses the optimal strategies. This section discusses the
default designs for the tax deferred DC accounts. Given the dramatic impact
of defaults on retirement saving behavior, we want the default to be as good as
possible. Is the current popular default design the best possible design in welfare
terms? If not, can we design a better default which may achieve nearly optimal
welfare outcome? For designing the optimal default options, we model the cases
where individuals staying with the defaults throughout the life cycle, as if the
default DC plan were made mandatory.
We consider four specications of default designs. The main characteristics of
these default designs are summarized in the following table.
Default #1 Default #2 Default #3 Default #4
portfolio constant age-dependent constant age-dependent
contribution constant constant age-dependent age-dependent
Table 1: Overview of the default designs
Under each given default design specication, the individuals in the model op-
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timize the their objective (3.8), subject to the budget constraints in TA and TDA
(3.9, 3.10), and no-borrowing constraint (3.12) and no-short selling constraint
(3.15). Detailed solution methodology is given in Appendix B. In Section 5, we
will compare the welfare costs of di¤erent default designs relative to the optimal
strategies, and investigating whether the age-dependent default is able to help to
reduce the welfare cost.
3.4.1 Default #1: constant contribution rate and constant port-
folio
This default is featured by a constant contribution rate and a constant portfolio
choice throughout (working) life. These constant features resemble the current
standard default options, which typically x the contribution rate at 4% and
invest in money market accounts, without further adjustment.
Individuals under this default design optimize utility over life time consump-
tion, by choosing the consumption level in each period, and a constant saving rate
m and a constant portfolio  at the beginning of their careers. E¤ectively, we are
replacing the optimal strategies in Section 3 by constants, i.e., DCt = 

t = ;
and mDCt = m (with 0  m  20%): As before, borrowing and short sales are not
allowed, which implies 0 W t ; and 0    1 respectively. The problem is solved
numerically, by rst optimizing the welfare level for given levels of contribution
rate, and then determining the best contribution rate. Details of the solution
procedure is given in Appendix B.
Table 2 shows, for a given at contribution rate, the corresponding optimal
xed portfolio choice and the welfare level under the specication of Default #1.
It shows that if contribution rate is xed at 4%, then the best portfolio is investing
82.5% in equities throughout life cycle. This gives an annual certainty equivalent
consumption of 0.654 units of rst year labor income; Or, relative to the fully
optimal TDA / TA benchmark (i.e., the upper limit) CECTDATA = 0:6885; it
gives 95% of the optimal welfare level. Table 2 also shows the results for two
additional asset allocations: one with 50% in equities and 50% in risk free asset,
another case with 100% in risk free asset (as in the current defaults). The 50%/50%
asset mix reduces the welfare levels slightly, for each given contribution rate. But
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the 100% risk free investment strategy is clearly sub-optimal, resulting in a large
welfare loss. The current default with a xed contribution rate at 4% and invest in
money market accounts gives maximally 92.7% of the optimal welfare benchmark
level.
When comparing the CEC across di¤erent contribution rates, we nd that, for
the assumed amount of tax benet, without employer matching, the zero contri-
bution is the best outcome. It means that the tax benet in our baseline model
is not large enough to compensate for the liquidity loss when young. Because the
individual can not borrow from the future labor income, the contribution rates
early in life is too high, so that the liquidity constraint become more severe.
Table 3 shows the variant with employer matching. In this case, the employee
contributesm per cent of income, and the employer matches the contributions with
a cap at 6% as in (3.16). Table 3 shows that for a contribution rate of 4%, the
optimal asset mix is 82.5% in equities. This gives an annual certainty equivalent
consumption of 0.664 units of rst year labor income; relative to the fully optimal
TDA / TA benchmark CECTDATA = 0:702, it gives 94.6% of the optimal welfare
level. When comparing the CEC across di¤erent contribution rates, it seems that,
the employer matching together with the tax deferrals stimulate DC savings. Our
model suggests that a small but positive contribution rate of 1% is benecial for
the individual.
3.4.2 Default #2: constant contribution rate and age-dependent
portfolio
Changing from Default #1, we relax the restriction of a constant portfolio through-
out life, but replacing it with an age-dependent strategy. One popular rule de-
scribes a linearly relationship between age (denoted by t   t0) and the share of
risky assets as
!t = max[0; min[f0 + f1 (t  t0) ; 1]] (3.19)
The individual follows the the age-dependent allocation rule. Individual optimizes
his life time utility of consumption by choosing consumption in each period, and
choosing the constant saving rate m and the parameter (f0; f1) at the beginning
of his career. As before, borrowing or short sales are not allowed, which implies
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0  !t  1 and 0  m  20%:
Figure 7 shows the optimized age-dependent portfolio rule corresponding to
a given contribution rate of 4%. This life cycle fund resembles the age prole of
the optimal portfolio choices shown in Figure 3. Figure 8 shows the resulting life
cycle quantile proles of consumption (left panel) and the wealth accumulation is
both TA and TDA accounts (right panel). Comparing to the optimal strategies
in Section 3, the consumption in this default is slightly lowered for the young,
and slightly higher for the retirees, because of the constant contribution rate of
4%. Since the contribution rate is xed at 4%, the accumulated DC wealth at
the end of the working period is substantially smaller than the one in the optimal
situation.
3.4.3 Default #3: age-dependent contribution rate and constant
portfolio
Changing from Default #1, we relax the restriction of a constant contribution
rate throughout life, but still keep the constant portfolio in both TA and TDA.
Therefore the main features of the TDA are the age-dependent contribution rate
and a constant portfolio choice. A simple age-dependent contribution rate may
depend linearly on age as follows:9
mt = max[0; min[d0 + d1(t  t0); 20%]] (3.21)
Suppose the individual follows the age-dependent contribution rule. The in-
dividual optimizes his life time utility of consumption by choosing consumption
in each period, and choosing the constant portfolio  and the parameter (d0; d1)
for the contribution schedule at the beginning of his career. As before, borrowing
and short sales are not allowed, which implies 0    1 and 0  mt  20%:
Figure 9 shows the optimized age-dependent contribution rule and portfo-
9An alternative modeling of the age-dependent contribution rate may include the quadratic
term in age. For example
mt = d0 + d1  (t  t0) + d2  (t  t0)
2 (3.20)
This alternative modeling is able to capture the possible hump shape of the optimal contribution
rates as seen in Section 3. This specication will be investigated in the future research.
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lio choice (which is 85%) for Default #3. The age-dependent contribution rule
resembles the optimal life-cycle contribution prole as in Figure 3 (Section 3).
Following this default, the individuals do not contribute to the DC plan during
the rst 12 years of working period, because of the liquidity constraints. Between
age 38 and 60, the contribution rates are non-zero and increase linearly with age,
by about 0.8% per year. Between age 60 and 64, the individuals are not liquidity
constrained any longer, therefore the maximum contributions are optimally cho-
sen, driven by the tax benets. Figure 10 shows the resulting life cycle quantile
proles of consumption (left panel) and the wealth accumulation is both TA and
TDA accounts (right panel). We see that DC wealth is accumulated rapidly after
mid-age.
3.4.4 Default #4: age-dependent contribution rate and age-dependent
portfolio
Default #4 is a combination of Default #2 and #3. It species an age-dependent
contribution rule and an age-dependent portfolio rule, i.e.,
mt = max[0; min[d0 + d1(t  t0); 20%]] (3.22)
!t = max[0; min[f0 + f1 (t  t0) ; 1]] (3.23)
Figure 11 shows the optimized age-dependent contribution rate (left panel) and
age-dependent portfolio rule (right panel) of Default #4 (no employer matching).
There is no employer matching provided. The age-dependent contribution rate
prole is very close to that obtained under Default #3 in Figure 9. The individual
starts contributing into the tax-deferred DC scheme after age 35, and increases the
contribution rate each year till age 55, when the contribution cap is reached. The
age-dependent portfolio prole shows a similar decreasing pattern, where equity
exposure starts to decline from 100% around age 50, till 60% at the end of life.
The resulting consumption and wealth accumulation proles are very close to the
ones shown in Figure 4 as in the optimal benchmark setup.
Figure 12 (left panel) shows the optimized age-dependent contribution rate
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of Default #4 when employer matching is provided. The solid line depicts the
contribution rate made by the employee and the dashed line depicts the total
contribution rate together with the matching. The individual starts contributing
into the tax-deferred DC scheme after age 35, and increases the contribution rate
each year till age 50, when the total contribution rate reaches the ceiling of 20%.
The age-dependent portfolio prole shows a similar decreasing pattern but with
slightly higher exposure to equities. The equity exposure starts to decline from
100% around age 55, till 70% at the end of life.
3.5 Welfare comparisons
3.5.1 Baseline model
Table 4 summarizes the main ndings of this paper. Table 4 compares the opti-
mal strategies with the current default design, and the step by step improvements
above it. The rst row ("TDA & TA") reports the certainty equivalent consump-
tion (CEC) of the optimal strategies, which sets an upper limit of the welfare
level. The welfare measure, CEC, is expressed in units of rst-year gross income.
The second row ("Current Default") reports the CEC obtained under the current
default setting of 4% contribution rate and zero equity exposure ( = 0). The
current default maximally reaches 92.7% of the optimal welfare benchmark.
Starting from the current situation, we rst improve the asset allocation to a
portfolio with 50% in equities, while keeping the contribution rate at 4%. This step
improves the welfare from 92.7% to 94.8% of the optimal level, as in the third row.
When further improve the asset allocation to an optimal level of 82.5% in equities,
keeping the contribution rate at 4%, the welfare is slightly improved to 95% of
the optimal benchmark, as reported in the forth row. Then, we further improve
the asset allocation by choosing an optimal life cycle fund, using the specication
of Default #2. This step further improves the welfare to 95.2%, as reported in
the fth row. We see that, the completely risk free asset allocation is clearly sub-
optimal for a reasonable risk averse individual ( = 5): Having a naive portfolio
(e.g., 50% / 50%) improves the welfare by 2%. Having an optimal age-dependent
portfolio only further enhance the welfare slightly (by another 0.2%).
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Now, instead of improving the asset allocation, we replace the at contribution
rate by an optimal age-dependent contribution rate (as specied in Default #3),
with a portfolio investing 85% in equities. This step further improves the welfare
by 4%, up to 99.2% of the optimal welfare level, as reported in the seventh row.
Compared to the current default, the total welfare gain amounts to 2.7 times of
rst year income over an adulthood of 60 years.
In the last row, when having both contribution and portfolio defaults age-
dependent (as in Default #4), the welfare comes very close to the optimal level, i.e.,
reaching 99.4% of the optimal level. Similarly, the welfare improvement obtained
from the age-dependent portfolio rule above the optimal xed mix is small (about
0.2%).
Another way to improve from the current defaults is by rst changing the
contribution rates to age-dependent rule, while keeping the asset allocation in risk
free asset, i.e.,  = 0. The CEC is immediately improved to 0.668 from 0.638, as
given in the sixth row. Improving the contribution policy alone increases welfare
from 92.7% to 97.1% of the optimal level, while improving the asset allocation
alone increases welfare from 92.7% to 95.2%. We see that contribution policy
plays a bigger role in improving the welfare.
Figure 13 shows additional results for the sixth and seventh row (Default #3)
as in Table 4. The gure depicts the two age-dependent contribution rate rules
which correspond to two di¤erent asset allocations, i.e., 100% risk free investment
v.s. the optimal asset mix of  = 85%, based on the baseline model assumptions
( = 5;  = 0:97). The two contribution defaults are close to each other, meaning
that the optimal age-dependent contribution rule is robust with respect to portfolio
mix. The di¤erence in contribution rates is small, maximally 2%. Figure 13 shows
that slightly higher contribution rates are necessary to compensate for the low
equity exposure (the lower expected returns). The resulting welfare loss is 2% as
reported in Table 4 (the sixth and seventh rows).
The variants of DC schemes with employer matching give very similar welfare
results, as reported in Table 5. The ndings observed from the baseline model
still hold in the setting with employer matching.
Our main ndings are the following. First, the simple age-dependent contribu-
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tion rule and appropriate investment strategies can achieve nearly optimal welfare
level. We nd potentially large economic welfare gains by following the simple
age-dependent contribution rule above the current standard default design. Using
the fully optimal strategies as welfare benchmark, the current default design deliv-
ers maximally 92.7% of welfare relative to the optimal welfare level. Whereas, the
age-dependent contribution and investment default design delivers up to 99.4% of
the optimal welfare level. Comparing to the current defaults, the age dependent
defaults lead to 7.2% increase of the certainty equivalent consumption per year
(which is 0.046 units of rst year labor income). Over 60 years (in adulthood),
the welfare gain amounts to 2.78 times rst year labor income.
Second, we nd that the contribution (or saving) choice has larger impact on
welfare than the portfolio choice does. Comparing to the current default (with  =
0; m = 4%), improving the contribution policy alone (keep  = 0) increases welfare
from 92.7% to 97.1% of the optimal level; while improving the asset allocation
alone (with m = 4%) increases welfare from 92.7% to 95.2%. Another example
shows a similar result: Replacing the optimal xed asset mix by an optimal life
cycle fund, the welfare is only increased only 0.2%. The life cycle literature has
mainly focused on the importance of portfolio choices. Here we show that setting
the contribution (or saving) right is more important in welfare terms.
3.5.2 Sensitivity analyses
We want to know how sensitive the age-dependent contribution and investment
rules are with respect to di¤erent model assumptions, e.g. risk and time prefer-
ences, income prole, life expectancy, etc. If the age-dependent default rules are
not very sensitive to the assumptions, then the defaults are applicable for het-
erogeneous participants. Otherwise, we should better tailor make the defaults by
rst characterizing the participants by questionnaires.
Risk and time preference
What are the optimal strategies for a  = 8 individual? Figure 14 and 15 show
the age proles of the optimal contribution rates, optimal portfolio choices, and
the resulting consumption and wealth accumulation. The optimal welfare for the
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 = 8 investor is CECTDATA;=8 = 0:582. The  = 8 individual starts contribution
after age 30 (which is 5 years earlier than a  = 5 individual does as in Figure
3), and then gradually increases the contribution rate till the maximal level. The
portfolio choice is also more conservative since mid-age, where equity exposure is
20-30% lower as compared to  = 5.
Figure 16 compares the optimal age-dependent contribution rate for a more
risk averse individual ( = 8) with the benchmark  = 5 individual. The age-
dependent contribution rule in Figure 16 (according to Default #3) for the  = 8
individual approximates the age prole of the optimal contribution rates in Figure
14. The corresponding asset mix (according to Default #3) for the  = 8 individual
consists 55% in equities, compared to 85% of equities investments preferred by the
 = 5 individual. We x other parameters the same as the baseline model. We
observe that the contribution rule for the more risk averse individual is 4% higher
than that for the  = 5 individual. Also, the optimal strategy suggests that the
more risk averse individual should start contributing 5 years earlier than the  = 5
individual does.
What happens if a  = 8 individual steps into a scheme where the age-
dependent contribution rule is designed for  = 5 individuals, but the asset allo-
cation is xed at the right level (i.e., 55% in equities)? The resulted CEC in this
case is 0.571, which is 98.1% of the optimal level. The welfare loss is about 2%
compared to the optimal welfare level. The cumulative welfare loss amounts to
0.6 unit of rst year salary over a life time.
As to the sensitivity to the time preference parameter ; we nd that both
contribution and asset allocation rules are not very sensitive to di¤erent values for
; e.g.  = 0:95; 0:97; 0:99: To save space, the results are not shown here.
To conclude, we nd that the age-dependent contribution rate should be higher
and asset allocation should be more conservative for a more risk averse individual.
The welfare cost for a more risk averse individual to follow a contribution rule
that is designed for a less risk averse individual might be sizable. Therefore, it is
better to rst use questionnaire to characterize their risk preferences and design
the age-dependent defaults for each group.
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Wage earning prole
The baseline model assumes an individual with a steeper upward sloping earning
prole, as the case for higher educated individuals for example. The average
earning prole for lower educated individuals is atter. How does the atter
earning prole a¤ect the default designs? We set parameter a0 and a1 according
to the calibration of Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) for the low education
group, while keeping other parameters as the baseline setup. Figure 17 and 18
show the optimal strategies for individuals with at earning prole. We see that
the portfolio strategy is very close to that of a steeper earning individual (in Figure
3). However the contribution strategy starts about 6 years earlier and increases
more gradually than the steeper earning case. Because the life time income is
smaller for the lower educated group, the consumption and wealth quantile proles
are lower.
The age-dependent contribution and portfolio default rules mimic the optimal
strategies closely (gures not shown here to save space). We notice that, the age-
dependent contribution rule for at wage earners (e.g. lower educated individuals)
can start a few years earlier and gradually increase over time.
Life expectancy
The baseline model has assumed a life span of 85 years, with 40 years of working
and 20 years of retirement. What if the life span is increased to 95 years, with
40 years of working and 30 years of retirement? Figure 19 (left panel) shows the
optimal contribution strategy for the case with prolonged retirement period. The
optimal DC contribution starts around age 35, which is the same as the baseline
result, to avoid the liquidity constrained period. However, the contribution rates
increase much rapidly afterwards. This is because, the individual has to save more
to nance the longer retirement period. Figure 19 (right panel) shows the resulting
wealth accumulations in TA and TDA. The optimal portfolio strategy and con-
sumption proles are very similar to the baseline results, hence the gures are not
shown here. The age-dependent contribution default is similar as to the baseline
result in Figure 11 (left panel), but with a steeper slope (gure not shown to save
space). Therefore, when designing the age-dependent defaults, it is important to
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take the updated (population) life expectancy into account. The current uniform
default has no concern about life expectancy at all, which is very inappropriate.
3.6 Conclusions
Given the dramatic impact of defaults in individual DC schemes, we investigate
whether or not and how much we can improve the welfare by changing the default
design. We nd potentially large economic welfare gains by following the simple
age-dependent contribution rule above the current standard default design. Us-
ing the fully optimal strategies as welfare benchmark, the current default design
delivers only 92.7% of welfare relative to the optimal welfare level. Whereas, the
age-dependent contribution and investment default design delivers up to 99.4%
of the optimal welfare level. In terms of certainty equivalent consumption, the
age dependent default leads to 7.2% increase in annual consumption. Therefore
the simple age-dependent contribution and investment rules can achieve nearly
optimal welfare level.
Second, we nd that the contribution (or saving) choice has larger impact
on welfare than the portfolio choice does. As compared to the current defaults
(with at contribution rate of 4% and fully risk free investment), improving the
contribution policy alone increases welfare from 92.7% to 97.1% of the optimal
welfare level. However, improving the asset allocation alone only increases welfare
from 92.7% to 95.2%. Here we show that setting the contribution (or saving)
right is more important in welfare terms. The life cycle literature has been mainly
focusing on the portfolio choices. However we nd the contribution rule plays a
more important role in improving welfare.
As to the sensitivity of the defaults and the related implementation issues, we
show that, it is better to use questionnaire to categorize the risk preferences and
design the age-dependent defaults for each group. Furthermore, it is important
to take the updated (population) life expectancy into account when designing the
age-dependent contribution defaults.
As to the policy implications, the age-dependent contribution and investment
rules can be recommended as default. Our nding is consistent with the auto-save
features encouraged by the Pension Protection Act of 2006. This paper contributes
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to the life cycle literature and the DC industry by characterizing the optimal age-
dependent contribution and investment rules for DC participants. We show that
contribution policy plays a bigger role in improving the welfare.
74 DC pension plan defaults and individual welfare
3.7 Appendix A: Solution method of Section 3, with
TA and TDA
We use the dynamic programming and the Endogenous-Grid Method (Carroll
(2006, 2007)) to solve the extended life cycle model with two accounts. In the ap-




t ;Wt) and expenditures (Ht;Mt)
are all normalized by income Yt. The normalized variables are denoted in small
letters throughout. The state variables in this model are time and two wealth
processes.
3.7.1 Solving the retirement period
First, we solve the retirement periods (R  t  T ). Upon retirement, the taxable
savings and tax-deferred DC savings are combined into one savings, because both
are freely accessible for consumption. The combined wealth is denoted by WR =
W R + (1   o)WDCR : A lower tax rate  o is applied to the DC wealth at the
retirement date. Formally, the normalized objective function and the normalized
budget constraint, for the retirement period R  t  T; are
v (wt) = max
c1 t


















+(1   o)ss  ht+1  medt+1 (3.26)
wt  ct; 0  t  1 (3.27)
The optimal consumption and portfolio choice !t (a), c

t (a) and the endoge-
nous optimal wealth wt (a) (for a = fajgJj=1) can be found by following pro-
cedure. The procedure starts by dening a new variable, at = wt   ct; as the
after-consumption-wealth. Construct a grid of at = fajgJj=1: Now we solve for
the optimal consumption and portfolio policies for each given aj . The rst order
conditions w.r.t. t and ct are






















The Envelope theorem implies that u0 (ct) = v
0 (wt) ; since











Replace v0 (wt+1) by u


























where ct+1[wt+1] as the optimal consumption policy at time t+1, and Iu () denotes
the inverse function of u0 (ct) : Using any numerical solver, Eq (3.31) will give the
optimal portfolio weight t (at) for any given amount of investment at. Because
of the borrowing and short-selling constraints, we then impose the restriction
0  t  1. Then, eq (3.32) will give the corresponding consumption ct (at)
for any given amount of investment at. Finally, the optimal wealth process is
endogenously determined by wt = c

t (at) + at: The advantage of this method is
that the numerical search is only needed once in solving t (at), while c

t (at) can
be directly obtained from (3.32).
Hence we obtain the corresponding policy function ct (wt) for t  R. The value
obtained at time R can be decompose into two terms v (wR) = u (wR)K (T  R)






10After retirement, since there is no labor income nor social security available for the individual,
the model is the classical Merton (1969) model. Without any portfolio constraint, the value
function time time R has the following expression v (wR) =
w1 
1 
K (T  R) ; as shown in Merton
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Then, we solve the working periods (1  t < R). But before moving back-
ward into the working period, we need to map the vector of the single state variable
fwR (j)gJj=1 into two state variables with wi;j = wR(j) iI ; wDCi;j = wR(j) I iI (1   o)
 1 ;
with i = 0; 1; :::; I: This step is because both taxable and DC savings are state
variables for the working period optimization problem. In a similar way, we map
the vector fcR (j)gJj=1 into a matrix with cij = cR (j) for 8i = 0; 1; :::; I: Hence we






at time t = R.







at time t = R.
3.7.2 At time t = R  1
At time t = R   1, the individual has two accounts, TA and TDA. Therefore the
normalized value function has two state variables, wR 1; w
DC
R 1. The individual
has to decide how much to consume, cR 1, out of the TA wealth, and where to
locate his savings among the two accounts (by choosing mDCR 1); and nally the
individual has to decide the right portfolios ( ; DC) for both TA and TDA.
Formally, the normalized value function and the normalized budget constraint
are
(1969) and Munk (2007). With portfolio constraint (e.g. no-borrowing constraint), Grossman
and Vila (1992, proposition 3.2.) show that the value function has the expression v (wR) =
w1 
1 
K (T  R) ; with K (t) = exp
 
r + k  A2k2=2

(1 A) t:






















s.t. the budget constraint
wR = w

R + (1   o)wDCR (3.34)
wR =
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and the non-negative constraint (i.e. no borrowing) in both accounts
wR 1   cR 1   (1  y)mDCR 1  0; and mDCR 1  0 (3.38)
Notice that the value function is changed from with one state variable, v (wR) ;







Follow Carrolls idea, we dene two new wealth variables, namely the amount
available for investment in the taxable account aR 1 = w

R 1 cR 1 (1 y)mDCR 1;





We then choose a non-negative 1-D grid to discretize aR 1 = faj gJj=1  0; and do
the same for aDCR 1 = faDCh gHh=1  0:
Optimize portfolios
The rst step is to compute the optimal portfolio strategies for both accounts.


































(1   o) (3.40)
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Notice that the portfolios are function of a and aDC : We need to determine
R 1 and 
DC






. One special case is !R 1 =




R 1 = !R 1 for any combination of faj ; aDCh g:
First, for a given vale of investable wealth in TA and TDA, we simulate the next































The optimal portfolio !R 1 is the one that solves the following equation based




































is obtained by interpolat-








The second step is to calculate the optimal consumption for each combination of



































































Dene a new variable called before-consumption wealth bR 1 = a
 + cR 1 =
















In addition, we can evaluate the expected utility of the next period, for the given
























K (T  R) (3.52)
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Optimize contribution rate
The third step is to compute the optimal contribution rate 0.2 mR 1  0: It
sets an upper limit on contribution rate, i.e. the contribution is no larger than
20% of gross salary income.
FOC condition w.r.t. mR 1 can not solve the optimal contribution rate.
11
We need to use the value function itself to search the optimal contribution rate
numerically. First construct two exogenous grids for possible values of wealth
bw = fWngNn=1 and bwDC = fWngNn=1: Then, we construct a grid of possible
contribution rates. We start with the case without employer match. The grid
of possible contribution rates is denoted by bmR 1 = fmigMi=1  [0;mmax]; with
mmax = min (1; bw=(1  y)) : These implies a set of before-consumption wealth bb
and investable wealth baDC for any given combination of f bw ; bwDC ; fmigMi=1g; as
bbi = bw   (1  y)bmi > 0 (3.53)
baDCi = bwDC + bmi (3.54)
With employer match, e.g. mDCt = min (mt +min (mt; 6%) ; 20%), the grid of
possible contribution rates remains the same, but the implied bb and baDC become
bbi = bw   (1  y)bmi > 0 (3.55)
baDCi = bwDC + bmDCi (3.56)
If bbi and baDCi are known, then with the help of the interpolation relation



















which clearly doesnt hold in general. Since y > o; this FOC implies marginal cost of con-
tribution < martinal benet of contribution, therefore mDCR 1 should take some maximum value
(if exists). However the danger of doing so is that it implies wR 1 might be unlimited. Due to










we can back out the corresponding private wealth bai : It then leads
to the optimal consumption bci = bbi   bai ; for any given set of f bw ; bwDC ;mig:
We denote the implied consumption as ci
 
bw ; bwDC ;mi

: Furthermore, we can









: Finally, we can evaluate the trade-o¤ between the consumption
and the contribution using the recursive objective function as
$R 1( bwR 1; bwDCR 1)  max
fmigMi=1
(bci )1 





The optimal contribution rate is the one that maximize the above expres-
sion for given values of ( bwR 1; bwDCR 1): Lets denote it as m( bw ; bwDC): As a
by-product, we also get the corresponding consumption policy c(w ; wDC) =
c
 































































where $0 and $
0
DC denote the partial di¤erentials.
Optimal policies for t = R  1
For the last year of working, t = R   1, the optimal contribution rate is largely
100% of the labor income, except for when TA wealth (w ) is very limited, but the
TDA wealth (wDC) is abundant. The optimal consumption increases with TA and
82 DC pension plan defaults and individual welfare
TDA wealth in general. The special feature for the optimal consumption is that
there are kinks due to the liquidity constraint, i.e. individual can not consume
more than what they have in the taxable account. Similarly there are also kinks
for the value function. Except for this, the value function increases with both
wealth accounts.
Repeat the procedure
Now we are able to proceed to t = R   2; R   3; ::::1; by repeating the similar
procedure as for t = R   1. To generate the average pattern of life cycle port-
folio holding, as in Figure 1, we simulate the model from time 1 to T for 10,000
scenarios, and take the average over all simulated scenarios.
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Figure: The implied
before-consumption wealth b as





at time R  1.













Figure: (log) value function
-ln( $(w ; wDC)) at time R-1.
3.8 Appendix B: Solution method of Section 4
In Default #1, the contribution rate m  0 and portfolio allocations 0:2    0
are chosen at the beginning of the career (t = 0), and are xed throughout life
time. Notice that we the portfolio allocation for both accounts are assumed to be
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the same constant mix through out life time,  = DC = : Therefore, the value






for working period, and v (wt j ;m) for retirement period. We solve the model
numerically using dynamic programming.
For the nal period, the optimal consumption policy is to consume everything




Then we proceed to time t = T  1. During the retirement period (R  t  T  1),
the normalized value function (in recursive form) and wealth process are
v (wt j ;m) =
c1 t




v (wt+1 j !;m)
i
(3.64)
subject to the budget dynamics




+ (1  ) sst+1   ht+1  medt+1 (3.65)






For any given value of m and , we only need to optimize the consumption
choice ct.
The FOC w.r.t. ct is
u0 (ct) = Et






The Envelope theorem gives
v0 (wt j ;m) = Et
h




= u0 (ct) (3.67)
So, pushing one period ahead, we have v0 (wt+1 j ;m) = u0 (ct+1) :
Dene a new variable, at = wt ct; as the after-consumption-wealth. Construct
a grid of at = fajgJj=1: Now we solve for the optimal consumption and portfolio
policies for each given aj .






















Following the EGM, the optimal wealth process is endogenously determined
by wt = c

t (at) + at; for a given value of {m, g:
At time t = R, we split the single wealth variable wR into two wealth variables
wR and w
DC










During the working period (0  t  R  1), the normalized value function (in



















s.t. the wealth dynamics and no borrowing constraint as
wt+1 = (w




















0  wt   ct   (1  y)m (3.73)
Construct two investable wealth grids at  (wt   ct   (1  y)m) = faj gJj=1 





= faDCh gHh=1  0: Then calculate the optimal con-
sumption for each combination of faj ; aDCh g: We know the rst order conditions
w.r.t. ct is
u0 (ct) = Et
h
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Following the EGM, the optimal wealth process is endogenously determined







+ at + (1   y)m and w;DCt = aDC  mDC ; for a given
value of fm, g:
Repeat the above procedure for all values of fm, g: Finally, the optimal







For Defaults 2, 3 and 4, a similar procedure is applied when determining the
opimal shape of the contribution and portfolio rules.
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Table 2: Default #1, constant contribution rate and constant portfolio,
(no employer matching).
This table presents the welfare (CEC) under given at contribution rates and
several di¤erent portfolio weights in equities. (CECTDATA = 0:6885)
contrib. Optimal portfolio  50% in equities 100% risk free ( = 0)






0% 80% 0.675 98% 0.672 97.6% 0.661 96%
1% 80% 0.671 97.5% 0.67 97.2% 0.6534 95%
2% 80% 0.666 96.8% 0.664 96.5% 0.649 94.2%
3% 82:5% 0.661 96% 0.659 95.6% 0.644 93.5%
4% 82:5% 0.654 95% 0.653 94.8% 0.638 92.7%
5% 85% 0.648 94.2% 0.646 94% 0.633 91.9%
Table 3: Default #1, constant contribution rate and constant portfo-
lio, (with employer matching).
This table presents the welfare (CEC) under given at contribution rates and
several di¤erent portfolio weights in equities. (CECTDATA = 0:702):
contrib. Optimal portfolio  50% in equities 100% risk free ( = 0)






0% 80% 0.65 96.1% 0.672 95.7% 0.661 94.1%
1% 80% 0.676 96.3% 0.674 96% 0.658 93.7%
2% 80% 0.674 96% 0.672 95.7% 0.656 93.5%
3% 82:5% 0.670 95.4% 0.668 95.2% 0.654 93.2%
4% 82:5% 0.664 94.6% 0.663 94.4% 0.651 92.8%
5% 85% 0.656 93.5% 0.656 93.4% 0.647 92.1%
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Table 4: Welfare comparison across default designs (without employer
matching)
Designs default specication Welfare measure
portfolio contribution CEC CEC
CECTDATA
Fully Optimal TDA & TA t m

t 0.688 100%
Current Default  = 0 m = 4% 0.638 92.7%
D#1 (with better portfolio)  = 50% m = 4% 0.653 94.8%
D#1 (with best portfolio)  = 82:5% m = 4% 0.654 95%
D#2 (age-dep. portfolio)  age-dep. m = 4% 0.655 95.2%
D#3 (age-dep. contribution)  = 0 m age-dep. 0.668 97.1%
D#3 (age-dep. contrib., best portf.)  = 85% m age-dep. 0.683 99.2%
D#4 (age-dep contrib, age-dep portf)  age-dep. m age-dep. 0.684 99.4%
Table 5: Welfare comparison across default designs (with employer
matching)
Designs default specication Welfare measure
portfolio contribution CEC CEC
CECTDATA
Fully Optimal TDA & TA t m

t 0.702 100%
Current Default  = 0 m = 4% 0.651 92.8%
D#1 (with better portfolio)  = 50% m = 4% 0.663 94.4%
D#1 (with best portfolio)  = 82:5% m = 4% 0.664 94.6%
D#2 (age-dep. portfolio)  age-dep. m = 4% 0.668 95.1%
D#3 (age-dep. contribution)  = 0 m age-dep. 0.681 97%
D#3 (age-dep. contrib., best portf.)  = 85% m age-dep. 0.695 99%
D#4 (age-dep. contrib age-dep portf)  age-dep. m age-dep. 0.697 99.2%
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Figure 1: Income proles. (a) Left panel shows the life cycle prole of the
age-dependent idiosyncratic componentNt t0 ; (b) Right panel shows the aggregate
wage component, Gt:
Figure 2: Housing and medical expenditures. (a) Left panel shows the
mean and one simulation of the ratio of housing expenditure to income over life
cycle; (b) Right panel shows the mean and one simulation of the ratio of out-of-
pocket medical expenditure to income over life cycle.
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Figure 3: Optimal portfolio choice and consumption proles in TA/TDA.
(left panel ) Life-cycle portfolio choice assuming the identical asset allocation in
Taxable and Tax-deferred DC accounts (5%, 50%, 95% quantiles); (right panel)
Life-cycle consumption prole (5%, 50%, 95% quantiles).
Figure 4:Optimal contribution rate and wealth accumulation in TA/TDA.
(left panel) life-cycle contribution rate mt (5%, 50%, 95% quantiles), and (right
panel) wealth accumulation in Taxable and Tax-deferred DC accounts (5%, 50%,
95% quantiles).
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Figure 5: Optimal portfolio choice and consumption proles in TA/TDA
with employer matching. (left panel ) Life-cycle portfolio choice assuming the
identical asset allocation in Taxable and Tax-deferred DC accounts, (5%, 50% and
95% quantiles); (right panel) Life-cycle consumption with employer match.
Figure 6:Optimal contribution rate and wealth accumulation in TA/TDA
with employer matching. (left panel) life-cycle contribution rate mt with em-
ployer match (5%, 50% and 95% quantiles), and (right) asset accumulation in
Taxable and Tax-deferred DC accounts with employer match.
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Figure 7: Age-dependent portfolio rule in Default #2. The optimized
age-dependent portfolio rule for given contribution rate of 4%, as specied in
Default #2.
Figure 8: Consumption and wealth accumulation in Default #2. (left)
Life-cycle consumption, and (right) asset accumulation in Taxable and Tax-deferred
DC accounts, as specied in Default #2 (5%, 50% and 95% quantiles).
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Figure 9: The optimized age-dependent contribution rule for given
portfolio choice of 85%, as specied in Default #3.
Figure 10: Consumption and wealth accumulation in Default #3.
(left) Life-cycle consumption, and (right) asset accumulation in Taxable and Tax-
deferred DC accounts, as specied in Default #3 (5%, 50% and 95% quantiles).
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Figure 11: The optimized age-dependent contribution rate and port-
folio rule in Default #4. The age-dependent contribution rate (left panel) and
age-dependent portfolio rule (right panel) in Default #4 (no employer matching).
Figure 12: The optimized age-dependent contribution rate and port-
folio rule in Default #4 with employer matching. The age-dependent
contribution rate (left panel) and age-dependent portfolio rule (right panel) in
Default #4 (with employer matching).
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Figure 13: Sensitivity analysis: Contribution rule for di¤erent con-
stant asset mix. The optimal age-dependent contribution rate rules (default
#3) for di¤erent asset mix ( = 0% and 85% respectively), based on the baseline
preference assumptions ( = 5;  = 0:97).
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Figure 14: Optimal contribution and portfolio choice in TA/TDA for
di¤erent risk aversion. The age proles of the optimal contribution rates (left
panel), optimal portfolio choices (right panel) of a  = 8 individual in taxable and
tax-deferred DC account, without employer matching.
Figure 15: Optimal contribution and portfolio choice in TA/TDA for
di¤erent risk aversion. (left panel) The life cycle consumption and (right panel)
asset accumulation for a  = 8 individual in taxable and tax-deferred DC account,
without employer matching.
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Figure 16: The optimal age-dependent contribution rate rules (default
#3) for individuals with di¤erent risk aversion ( = 5 and 8 respec-
tively).
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Figure 17: Optimal portfolio and consumption proles for the case
with at wage earnings. (left panel ) Life-cycle portfolio choice assuming the
identical asset allocation in Taxable and Tax-deferred DC accounts (5%, 50% and
95% quantiles); (right panel) Life-cycle consumption prole.
Figure 18: Optimal contribution and wealth proles for the case with
at wage earnings. (left panel) life-cycle contribution rate mt (5%, 50% and
95% quantiles), and (right panel) wealth accumulation in Taxable and Tax-deferred
DC accounts.
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Figure 19: Optimal contribution and wealth proles for the case with
longer life span. (left panel) life-cycle contribution rate mt (5%, 50% and 95%
quantiles), and (right panel) wealth accumulation in Taxable and Tax-deferred
DC accounts (5%, 50% and 95% quantiles).
Chapter 4
Longevity Risk Pricing
This chapter is based on Cui (2008a).
4.1 Introduction
Longevity risks, i.e., unexpected improvements in life expectancies, impose a chal-
lenge on pension plans and insurance companies because small unexpected im-
provement in life expectancies may lead to severe solvency issues for these annuity
providers. Longevity-linked securities are designed to pay out more when a selected
population group lives longer than originally expected. They are attractive securi-
ties to nancial markets because, on one hand, they are desirable assets for annuity
providers to hedge their longevity risks, and on the other hand, investors may nd
these securities attractive for the benets of diversication provided that the risk
premia are set appropriately. Moreover, nancial markets may provide a more
e¢cient risk allocation than the traditional insurance markets. Although acad-
emic researchers, policy makers and practitioners have talked about it for years,
longevity-linked securities are not traded in nancial markets due to the pricing
di¢culty. This paper therefore proposes a new method to price the longevity risk
premia in order to tackle the pricing obstacles of the innovative longevity-linked
securities.
This paper contributes to the literature by quantifying the longevity risk pre-
mia in various longevity-linked securities (bonds, swaps, caps and oors), apply-
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ing the equivalent utility pricing principle. Based on the equivalent utility pricing
principle, we obtain a minimum risk premium required by the longevity insurance
seller and a maximum acceptable risk premium by the longevity insurance buyer.
These upper and lower bounds indicate a price range for negotiation between the
sellers and the buyers. The four main advantages of our methodology are: i) the
suitability for incomplete market pricing, ii) a narrow range of the risk premia,
iii) the consistency with other nancial market risk premia (like ination risk pre-
mium) and iv) its exibility in handling di¤erent payo¤ structures, basis risk and
natural hedging possibilities.
In practice, life insurers, also pension funds, claim that their annuity businesses
are losing money due to the unexpected longevity improvements over years. In
the past centuries remarkable improvements in human life expectancy have been
observed. The uncertainties about the further improvements of human life ex-
pectancy are referred to as the longevity risks. Oeppon and Vaupel (2002, in
Science) report striking evidences that the record life expectancy has been rising
nearly three months per year in the past 160 years, and the asserted ceilings on
life expectancy were surpassed repeatedly in the past century. In fact, the future
improvements of life expectancy are di¢cult to be predicted accurately.1 The gen-
eral opinion from the experts tends to be that the trend of longevity improvements
is certain, but deviations to both sides are possible.
Reinsurance contracts do exist, but the capacity of reinsurance is limited
(OECD (2005)). By a reinsurance contract, the longevity risk is concentrated
on one large reinsurance company. The reinsurance approach works best when
the underlying risks are diversiable. However, the fact that longevity risk is a
systematic risk weakens the diversication principle that the reinsurance requires.
Longevity risk cannot be reduced by diversication or increasing the size of the
pool.2
Alternatively, the longevity risk could be transferred to nancial markets, also
known as securitization. By transferring longevity risk to nancial markets, the
1Brown and Orszag (2006) discuss the di¢culties in making an accurate mortality projection.
2We must di¤erentiate mortality risk from longevity risk. Mortality risk refers to the uncer-
tainty about individual death events when the life expectancy is known. Therefore, mortality
risk is a micro risk, and can be diversied by increasing the size of the pool.
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risk is distributed among a (large) number of market participants who can shoul-
der the risk better, i.e., achieving more e¢cient risk allocation. Longevity-linked
securities are one of the current nancial market innovations. The rst longevity
bond was announced by the EIB and BNP3 Paribas in November 2004, but it has
been under-subscribed, and withdrawn for redesign in late 2005.4 The EIB/BNP
survivor bond is a coupon-based bond, with oating annual coupons linked to a
cohort survivor index. The problem with this issuance is that there is no clear
view on how longevity risk should be charged. The EIB/BNP survivor bond re-
quired a longevity risk premium of 20 basis points, which was regarded as too high
for some annuity providers. The EIB/BNP bond, although linked to the British
survivor index, was also marketed among Dutch pension funds. However, it was
not clear for the Dutch pension funds whether the 20 basis points was a good deal
or not.
The origin of the pricing di¢culty lies in the fact that the nancial market
is incomplete when longevity securities are not traded. Therefore, the goal of
this paper is to provide a pricing framework suitable for pricing longevity risks in
incomplete market setting. Based on the equivalent utility pricing principle, our
method obtains the minimum risk premium required by the longevity insurance
seller and the maximum acceptable risk premium by the longevity insurance buyer.
We nd that the size of the risk premium depends on the payo¤ structure of the
security, the nancial strength of the seller and the buyer and the availability of
the natural hedge. We show that di¤erent payo¤ structures and maturities may
lead to di¤erent risk premia because the market is incomplete. We also show
that nancially stronger issuer may require a lower risk premium. Furthermore,
the risk premium could be reduced by distributing the longevity risk among more
market participants. The market calls for more longevity bond issuers in order
to achieve more e¢cient allocation and reduce the longevity risk premium. One
3EIB/BNP stands for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Banque Nationale de Paris
(BNP).
4Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2006) address the associated obstacles in current market develop-
ment of longevity-linked securities. The obstacles are categorized into design issues (regarding
the payo¤ structure, maturity, choice of survivor index, nominal or real payments, etc.), pricing
issues and institutional issues. As to the pricing issues, the authors comment that even if the
(survivor) bond provides a perfect hedge, there will be uncertainty over what the right price to
pay or charge should be."
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important implication for the market development of longevity-linked securities is
that multiple sellers, instead of a single seller, are required.
In this paper, the longevity risk is modeled as proposed by Lee and Carter
(1992), and estimated according to the U.K. and the Dutch mortality data. How-
ever our pricing methodology is quite general. Other stochastic mortality models
are also suitable for our pricing framework.
Recently, a few approaches to price longevity risk were proposed in the liter-
ature. Friedberg and Webb (2005) apply Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
and Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) to estimate the
longevity premium. Their result based on CAPM leads to a risk premium of 75
basis points, with condence interval ranging from -75 to 230 basis points, due
to inaccuracy in estimating the beta. Their result based on CCAPM is merely
two basis points, due to the low variation in consumption data. The discrepancy
between the author claimed 2 bp and the market claimed 20 bp is similar to the
equity premium puzzle using the CCAPM approach. Milevsky, Promislow and
Young (2005, 2006) proposed a Sharpe ratio approach, which is based on mean
and volatility of payments instead of returns. The methodology used in this paper
is the equivalent utility pricing principle. Our approach is suitable for pricing
in incomplete market. It provides a narrow price range for negotiation. The re-
sulting risk premia are consistent with other nancial market risk premia (like
ination risk premium). Our pricing framework is exible in handling di¤erent
payo¤ structures, basis risk and natural hedging possibilities.
Apart from securitization, there are three other possibilities of managing longevity
risk,5 namely hedging, reserving and risk sharing. The longevity risk could be
partly hedged using natural hedging, for example between life annuity and term
insurance. This paper illustrates the e¤ect of the natural hedging on longevity
risk premia. The impact of natural hedging is potentially signicant.
The organization of this paper is the following: Section 2 introduces stochas-
tic mortality models in order to quantify longevity risks. Section 3 describes
longevity-linked securities, and incomplete-market pricing principles. In Section 4
we quantify the (sellers minimum) longevity risk premium for EIB/BNP type of
longevity bonds using the equivalent utility pricing principle. Section 5 extends
5See also Brown and Orszag (2006), Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2006).
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the longevity risk premia calculation to other longevity linked securities, includ-
ing swaps, deferred bonds, oors and caps. Section 6 introduces the possibility of
natural hedging into our pricing framework. Section 7 considers buyers maximum
premium, together with the presence of basis risk. Section 8 concludes.
4.2 Stochastic MortalityModels and Longevity-Linked
Securities
This section rst presents a stochastic mortality model to quantify longevity risks,
and then describes the longevity-linked securities in more details.
4.2.1 Stochastic Mortality Models
The literature of stochastic mortality trend starts from Lee and Carter (1992).6
According to Deaton and Paxson (2004), the Lee-Carter model has become the
leading statistical model of mortality in the demographic literature. Therefore,
the numerical results presented in this paper are based on Lee and Carter (1992)
model.
Other stochastic mortality models may also t well in our pricing framework.
Dahl (2004) and Schrager (2006) advocate the a¢ne stochastic mortality models
to capture the birth cohort mortality dynamics over ones life cycle instead of the
time series of an age group over time. We leave the a¢ne stochastic mortality
approach as a future work for robustness analysis.
Lee and Carter (1992) model the time series behavior of log central death
rate of an age group by using a single latent factor. The latent factor drives the





, is determined by a common latent factor, t; with an age-specic





= x + xt + x;t (4.1)
6Various extensions of the Lee-Carter model can be found in Cairns, Blake and Dowd (2005b),
Hari, De Waegenaere, Melenberg and Nijman (2006).
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are white noises. And t satises a
random walk with drift process as
t = c+ t 1 + "t (4.2)





are white noises. x;t and "t are indepen-
dent.
Assuming that the force of mortality is constant during a year x+u;t+u = x;t
(0  u < 1), the survival probability at time t of the x-year-old over one-year




. Similarly, the conditional
probability at time t of an x-year-old surviving next  years is given by








We estimate this model using the yearly U.K. (England and Wales) and Dutch
male mortality data from 1880 to 2003, downloaded from the Human Mortality
Database.7 Appendix A provides a more detailed treatment of the model, together
with its estimation and simulation procedures. The estimation results using the
British data are included in the main text below, while the estimation results using
the Dutch data are reported in Appendix A.
The estimated latent process (in the United Kingdom) is the following, includ-
ing two temporary shocks captured by a WWI dummy and a WWII dummy8:
t =  0:0725 + t 1 + 0:65 WWIt + 1:9 WWIIt + "t (4.4)
with the volatility b" = 0:169: The dummy variables do not change the drift but
reduce the volatility of the innovations.
7Human Mortality Database University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or
www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on March 27, 2006).
8The WWI dummy takes non-zero values for years {1914 =1.5; 1915 = 1.5; 1916 = 1; 1917
= 1; 1918 = 1; 1919 = -4; 1920 = -2} and zero elsewhere. The WWII dummy takes non-zero
value for years {1940 = 1; 1944 = 0.1; 1945 = 0.1; 1946 = -1.2} and zero elsewhere.
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FIGURE 1: The estimated Lee-Carter (1992) model parameters, with x (left
upper panel), t (right upper panel); ax (left lower panel) and lnx (right lower
panel, the top curve for x = 65, and the bottom dashed curve for x = 35).
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FIGURE 2 (a): The forecasted force of mortality x+t (left panel) and the
forecasted survival probabilities tpx (right panel) of the 65-year-old cohort retiring
in year 2004.
FIGURE 2 (b): The standard deviation (left) and skewness (right) of the simulated
survival probability, tp65:
Assuming that the estimated model (4.4) is the true process, and taking
the estimated parameters as of year 2003, we could simulate the latent process
t and the resulting survival probabilities of the 65-yaer-old male cohort from
year 2004 onwards. Figure 2(a) describes the distribution of a set of simulated
survival probabilities of the 65-year-old male. From Figure 2(b) we see that the
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volatility of the survival probabilities exhibits a hump shape, which means that
the uncertainty over a longer horizon (up to 20 years) rst increases and then
decreases. The distribution is also skewed. The skewness increases with age.
Using the estimation results, we can show the size of the uncertainties involved
in life expectancy and annuity prices. The expected remaining life time of an x-
year-old at time t is given by







where ! denotes the maximum obtainable age, e.g., ! = 110. The price of an
immediate annuity paying 1 euro in each surviving year, assuming a xed and at
yield curve r, is given by







According to the estimated Lee-Carter model, the remaining lifetime of a 65-year-
old British male in year 2004, is 16 years with standard error of [ 0:2] years, as
given by (4.5). An immediate annuity paying 1 euro in each surviving year on
average worthies9 13:1 euro, assuming a xed and at yield curve at r = 2%, as
given by (4.6). The standard error of the value of this annuity is [ 0:15] euro, or
[ 1:1%] in relative terms. The longevity risk in these immediate annuities is not
negligible.
4.2.2 Longevity-Linked Securities
Given the potential size of the longevity trend uncertainty, nancial markets pro-
posed longevity-linked securities. The rst longevity bond was announced by the
EIB and BNP Paribas in November 2004, but withdrawn for redesign in late
2005. The EIB/BNP bond is a coupon-based bond, in which the notional an-
nual coupon is indexed to a cohort survivor index in England and Wales. This
cohort retires at age 65 in 2004. The maturity of this bond is 25 years. Section
9Moneys worth of annuity is the expected discounted value of future payments, without risk
loadings.
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4 discusses the pricing of such bonds. Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2006) address
the lessons learned from the failure of the EIB/BNP survivor bond and provide
constructive suggestions for future developments of the ourishing new market.
The main lessons are the following:
1) The designed 25-year horizon is perhaps too short for an e¤ective hedge,
since longevity risk in the near future (<10 years) is small.
2) The up-front capital requirement is large, especially since a major part of
the capital is taken by the ine¤ective hedge coupons in the near future.
3) The coupons are indexed to 65-year-old males, but annuity providers worry
about longevity risk of younger cohorts and females.
4) There is large uncertainty about what the right price is that should be
charged.
5) Hedge failure or basis risks are large, due to a number of ways: the reference
population is di¤erent from that of an annuity provider, the survivor index is not
timely available, etc.
6) The payments are nominal, whereas most pension schemes aim at ination-
linked real payments.
Their paper also introduces a few innovative hypothetical mortality-linked se-
curities as potential solutions to the aforementioned problems. These securities
include Zero-Coupon Longevity Bonds, Longevity Bull Spread Bonds, Deferred
Longevity Bonds, Vanilla Mortality Swaps, Survivor Caps and Floors, Mortality
Swaptions and Longevity Future. Enlightened by these discussions, this paper
presents the required longevity risk premia in di¤erent longevity-linked security
designs, including zeros, EIB/BNP bonds, swaps, caps and oors and deferred
longevity bonds. This paper also considers the impacts of natural hedge and basis
risk in Sections 6 and 7.
4.3 Longevity Risk Pricing Principles, A Review
This section reviews the recent literatures on incomplete market pricing, and mo-
tivates our choice of the methodology. Finally, we specify the utility preference
needed for the equivalent utility pricing principle.
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CAPM- and CCAPM-based approach. Friedberg and Webb (2005) ap-
ply Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Consumption-based Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CCAPM) to estimate the premium for longevity risk. The authors
construct a pseudo-EIB/BNP survivor bond. Let Rb;t denote the returns of such
pseudo survivor bonds. Following the CAPM, the longevity risk premium is its
beta, which is dened by b = cov (Rb; Rm) =
2
m; times the market risk premium:
Et(Rb) Rf = b [E (Rm) Rf ]
The authors claim that the beta on pseudo-EIB/BNP bond is 0.15 with 95
percent condence interval of [-0.15, 0.46]. Therefore, if market risk premium
is 5 percent, the longevity risk premium on this bond is 75 basis points, with
condence interval of [-75, 230] basis points. Given the wide condence interval,
the authors suggest that CCAPM as a better alternative.
Following the CCAPM, the longevity risk premium is determined by the re-






The paper shows that the correlation between consumption growth and sur-
vivor bond returns is -0.1958 and is signicant. However, since the standard
deviation of mortality bond returns is small, as a result, the covariance between
survivor bond returns and consumption growth is extremely small at -0.0015 per-
cent. Applying the CCAPM, the risk premium is only two basis points when
the coe¢cient of risk aversion equals 10. This result is far below the 20 bp risk
premium marketed in the EIB/BNP bonds.
Sharpe ratio approach. Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) suggest that the
absolute value of the Sharpe ratio on any unhedgeable portfolio should be bounded,
so that too good deals are ruled out. Milevsky, Promislow and Young (2005,
2006) propose a so-called instantaneous Sharpe ratio to determine the mortality
risk premia. Using the analogy to the Sharpe ratio in the nancial market, which
is the ratio of the expected excess return and the return volatility SRMarket :=
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(E[R] Rf ) =[R], the Sharpe ratio in the insurance context could be dened as
the excess payo¤ above the expected payment, divided by the standard deviation
of the risky payment, SRInsur := (N(1 + L)  E[WN ]) =[WN ]: The authors argue
that the longevity risk loading L will be set so that the Sharpe Ratio is consistent
with other asset classes in the economy. For example, if the Sharpe ratio for large
cap equities is roughly 0.25, then the Sharpe ratio of the insurance policy should
also be bounded within a similar magnitude.10
Equivalent utility based approach. The pricing method proposed in
this paper is based on the equivalent utility pricing principle. The equivalent
utility based approach is a popular pricing methodology for incomplete market
setting. The related literature includes Svensson and Werner (1993), Young and
Zariphopoulou (2002), Young (2004), Musela and Zariphopoulou (2004), De Jong
(2007), Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2007) and other references listed in the bib-
liography. As pointed out by Svensson and Werner (1993), the shadow value of a
non-traded or non-hedgeable asset (the price of longevity risks in this case) can
be interpreted as an additional amount of wealth added to the investors bud-
get so that the investor is indi¤erent between holding a non-hedgeable asset and
hedgeable asset. Furthermore, the shadow value is investor-specic, depending on
the investors preference. In the context of longevity-linked securities, equivalent
utility pricing principle reveals the minimum compensation required by the seller
and the maximum price acceptable to the buyer. Therefore, this paper shows the
range of possible prices for the longevity-linked securities before the market opens
up.
De Jong (2007) applies the principle of equivalent utility in pricing wage-linked
securities, in an incomplete market setting. In the context of dened benet
pension fund liability valuation, the main source of unhedgeable risk is the real
wage growth. The pension fund is modeled as a potential buyer of the wage-linked
bonds. Hence the equivalent utility pricing gives the maximum risk premium that
the pension fund is willing to pay in order to obtain the insurance against the
wage rate uctuations. The paper shows the risk premium is determined by the
10The authors are still working on the estimation of the Sharpe ratio using annuity rate quotes.
The results are not available yet.
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additional wealth needed to be invested in the nancial market in order to provide
the participants the same level of utility as a fully wage-indexed pension.
Assuming exponential utility function, Musela and Zariphopoulou (2004), as
well as Henderson (2002), show a simple analytical formula for pricing an non-
traded claim. As we shall see, the pricing formula of the longevity-linked claims
derived in this paper is consistent with the result found by above mentioned au-
thors. The next sub-section illustrates the idea of equivalence pricing principle
using a very simple model. The complete model is treated in Section 4.
4.3.1 An Application
Before going into the pricing, let us x some notations. In the context of annuities,
let N denote the initial size of the x-year-old cohort at time zero, and K is the
agreed amount of annuity payment per annual. In the context of longevity bonds
with varying coupons, NK denotes the notional coupon, and NKtpx is the actual
amount of coupon due in year t. In this paper, K is normalized to 1. Finally, the
number of survivors in this cohort in year t is given by St = NKtpx: The survival
index in t years time is a random variable, with mean E[St], and variance V ar[St]:
We assume that the longevity risk is the only risk factor in this simple illustration.
Now we illustrate the equivalent pricing principle by pricing a zero coupon
longevity bond, with maturity of t years. Such zero coupon bond is e¤ectively a
large group of single premium endowment contracts which pays an agreed amount
(normalized to K = 1) at a future time t to the survivors of the current x-year-old
cohort. The longevity risk can be described as the deviation from the expected
survival rate, St   E[St]: Lets call the longevity bond issuance company (or the
pure endowment seller) the seller, since the seller provides insurance against
longevity risk. The single premium is paid at time zero, and consists of two parts.
One part is the expected loss E[St]; the other part is a risk premium loading P .
The seller invests her initial wealthW0 and the received total premium (E [St]+
P ) in risk free asset. Further assume that the risk free rate is zero, hence,Wt =W0.
The minimum premium loading for this single premium endowment contract is the
lowest amount that the seller asks for bearing the longevity risk St E[St]: Thus,
the minimum premium loading, denoted as P ; equalizes the expected utility of
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underwriting the risk St with a compensation E [St] + P
 ; with the utility of not
underwriting the risk, from the sellers viewpoint. Let U () denote the utility









Case 1: CARA utility
First we assume the seller has a constant absolute risk averse (CARA) utility:
















lnE [exp ( (St   E [St]))] (4.7)
The resulting risk loading in expression (4.7) is the so-called exponential risk
premium (Kaas, et al. (2001), p. 7). The total premium can be seen as the best
estimate plus the (macro) risk premium which equals the logarithm of the moment
generating function of risk St at argument  divided by the CARA coe¢cient :
Notice that the risk loading is not a¤ected by the initial wealth,W0; for the CARA
preference.
In a special case, if St is normally distributed, then the minimum loading P
 
is proportional to the variance of St; as given in expression (4.8). However, Figure
2(b) shows that the distribution of St is skewed. Therefore the handy expression
(4.8) is not an accurate approximation.
if St  N (E [St] ; V ar [St]) ;
then  (St   E [St])  N
 
0; 2V ar [St]










V ar [St] (4.8)
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Case 2: CRRA utility
Alternatively we assume the seller has a constant relative risk averse (CRRA)
utility: U(w) = w1 =(1   ): Notice that the risk loading does depend on the
initial wealth and risk aversion parameter for the CRRA preference. The minimum


























The risk loading P  of both cases can be evaluated by means of simulation.
Using the estimation and simulation procedures presented in Appendix A, we
calculate the expected loss E [St] and the risk loading P
  for the endowment
contract. The total premium paid per person is E[St]+P
 
N : We can express P
  in
terms of risk premium, Rp, which is a discount rate above the risk free rate (i.e.




E [St] + P
 
N







The risk premia for CARA and CRRA utility specications are presented in
Tables 1 and 2 below.
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maturity CARA = 1 CARA = 3 CARA = 5 CARA = 1 CARA = 3 CARA = 5 CARA = 1 CARA = 3 CARA = 5
5 0 0 0 -1 -2 -3 -5 -12 -15
10 0 -1 -1 -2 -7 -11 -18 -24 -26
15 -1 -2 -3 -6 -16 -24 -31 -38 -39
20 -1 -3 -5 -10 -28 -39 -48 -55 -57
25 -1 -4 -6 -13 -37 -54 -70 -82 -85
30 -1 -3 -4 -9 -27 -46 -78 -104 -109
35 0 -1 -1 -3 -9 -15 -31 -91 -112
N = 10 N = 100 N = 1000
TABLE 1: The longevity risk premium Rp in basis points, for di¤erent cohort
sizes (N=10, 100, 1000 103) and di¤erent risk aversion values
(CARA() = 1; 3; 5):
maturity CRRA = 3 CRRA = 5 CRRA = 8 CRRA = 3 CRRA = 5 CRRA = 8 CRRA = 3 CRRA = 5 CRRA = 8
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -3 -5
20 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -3 -5 -8
25 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -4 -6 -10
30 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -3 -4 -7
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2
N = 10 N = 100 N = 1000
TABLE 2: The longevity risk premium Rp in basis points, for di¤erent cohort
sizes (N=10, 100, 1000 103) and di¤erent risk aversion values
(CRRA() = 3; 5; 8): The initial wealth of the insurer is assumed to be
W0 = 100.
Key features of the results are: 1) The required risk premium is negative,
meaning that the bond yield is lower than the risk free rate, so that the bond
price is higher than the risk free bond. Thus, the insurer (i.e., the survivor bond
issuer) is compensated for bearing longevity risks. 2) The additional discount rate
Rp (in absolute value) increases as the size of the pool increases. 3) The more risk
averse the insurer is, the higher compensation is required. 4) Approximately, the
longer the maturity, the higher compensation is required.
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4.3.2 Preference Assumption
The results in Tables 1 and 2 reveal some unsatised properties of CARA and
CRRA preferences. For a CARA investor, he has the same worry about one addi-
tional euro loss no matter how rich or poor he is. For a CRRA investor, he cares
much less when he is rich. In our view, both preferences are too restrictive to
characterize the risk preference of nancial institutions. The CARA utility might
overestimate the longevity risk premium. Whereas, the CRRA utility might un-
derestimate the risk premium. Therefore, we modify the CARA utility, to make
the risk aversion depend on the initial capital or initial wealth of the company,
 (W0) = W
 b
0 ; where b 2 [0; 1]: In general, risk aversion decreases with initial
wealth.11 At the two extremes, the modied utility approaches CRRA specica-
tion when b = 1, and the modied utility is back to the CARA specication when
b = 0. The proposed preference (4.10) retains some convenient features of the
negative exponential utility function, since it is separable for independent risks x
and y, as E [u(x+ y)] = E [u(x)]E [exp ( y)] :
u (S) =   1
 (W0)
exp (  (W0)S) (4.10)
It is important to be clear about whose preference that (4.10) captures. Sec-
tions 3 to 5 focus on sellers minimum required risk premium. Therefore the utility
function (4.10) represents the preference of the shareholders of the seller. In the
context of the EIB/BNP longevity bond, it is the preference of the shareholders
of EIB/BNP. Section 6 discusses the buyers maximum risk premium. Hence the
utility function (4.10) represents the preference of the buyer, e.g., a pension fund.
4.4 Pricing of a Coupon-Based Longevity Bond
This section derives the minimum required longevity risk premium of a coupon
based longevity bond from the sellers point of view. The longevity bond is linked
to a large pool of population. Therefore mortality risk (also called micro longevity
risk) is fully diversied. The setup of the model is the following. The shareholder
11Wachter and Jogo (2007) (and their references) provide arguments and evidences for a wealth-
varying risk aversion.
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of a nancial company (like EIB/BNP) derives her utility from dividends and nal
wealth. We consider two alternative situations. In the rst situation, the company
does not insure longevity risk, hence is not exposed to longevity risk. In the second
situation, the company issues a longevity bond and hence bears longevity risk.
Furthermore, we assume that the macro longevity risk is independent from the
nancial risks. The methodology used in this section combines the martingale
approach with the equivalent utility pricing principle.
4.4.1 Setup
Problem 1 without longevity risk
Assume a complete nancial market, with constant risk free rate, r: The share-
holder (or manager) of the company derives her utility from dividends and nal
wealth at the end of the horizon, T . The per period utility is described as (4.10),
and  is the subjective discount rate of the shareholders. The initial equity capital
of the company is given by W0: The company maximizes the shareholders util-
ity by optimizing asset allocation (xt) and dividend (Dt) decisions. Formally the
















where Mt is the pricing kernel for the complete nancial market. Mt is dened by
dMt=Mt =  rdt  dZt (4.13)
where  is the market price of equity risk.
Problem 2 with longevity risk
In the same nancial market, the company issues coupon-based longevity bond,
in which the annual coupon is indexed to the 1939-born cohort survivor index.
This cohort retires in 2004 at age 65. The longevity risk is not hedgeable from the
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nancial market. Hence, the company derives her utility from dividends and the
residual claim (E[St] St) from the longevity risk. The initial equity capital of the
company is now augmented by an additional risk loading : The company maxi-
mizes her utility by optimizing asset allocation and dividend decisions. Formally







V 0 = E
Z T
0












=W0 +  (4.15)
Applying the equivalent utility pricing argument, we determine the mini-
mum risk compensation  such that the company is indi¤erent from bearing the
longevity risk and without the longevity risk. That is, the indirect utility must be
equal under these two situations:
V 0 () = V0: (4.16)
4.4.2 Results
The derivations are given in Appendix B. The main results are the following: The
risk loading  is a present value of the certainty equivalent compensations for the














Gt  E [exp (  (E[St]  St))]
The value of the coupon-based longevity bonds with maturity T can be de-
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composed into best estimated price (
R T
0 e
 rtE[St]dt) and longevity risk loading
():




Table 3 shows the normalized risk loading, beste stimate , of the coupon-based
longevity bonds with maturity T = 5; :::; 35 years. The risk loading depends on the
maturity of the bond, the size of initial equity capital and the risk aversion of the
insurer. Recall that the risk aversion is inversely related to the size of the capital,
as  (W0) =  (W0)
 b. When b changes from 1 to 0, the preference shifts from
CRRA to CARA, which results in an increase in risk loading. CRRA investor
requires virtually zero risk compensation. Whereas CARA investor requires a
sizable compensation, up to 1.6 percent of the best estimated cost.
We can also express the risk loading  in terms of risk premium, Rp, which
can be seen as an additional discount rate above the risk free rate to adjust for the
longevity risk. As explained in Section 3.1, the risk premium is negative, meaning
that the bond yield is lower than the risk free rate, so that the bond price is
higher than the risk free bond. Thus, the insurer (i.e., the survivor bond issuer)
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equity
maturity b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
5 0% 0% 0,0% 0,0% 0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
10 0% 0% 0,1% 0,2% 0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,2% 0% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2%
15 0% 0% 0,2% 0,5% 0% 0,1% 0,2% 0,5% 0% 0,2% 0,3% 0,5%
20 0% 0% 0,3% 0,9% 0% 0,2% 0,4% 0,9% 0% 0,3% 0,6% 0,9%
25 0% 0% 0,4% 1,4% 0% 0,3% 0,6% 1,4% 0% 0,4% 0,8% 1,4%
30 0% 0% 0,5% 1,5% 0% 0,3% 0,7% 1,5% 0% 0,5% 0,9% 1,5%
35 0% 0% 0,5% 1,6% 0% 0,3% 0,7% 1,6% 0% 0,5% 0,9% 1,6%
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 3: The normalized risk loading per person, =best estimate, of EIB/BNP
longevity bonds for di¤erent sizes of the initial equity capital,
W0 = [10000; 1000; 100] million, and di¤erent risk aversion specications
 (W0) =  (W0)
 b ; with  = 3; b = [1; 14 ;
1
8 ; 0]: The size of the insured pool is
N = 100 million, K = 1.
equity
maturity b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
5 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1
10 0 0 -1 -3 0 -1 -1 -3 0 -1 -2 -3
15 0 -1 -2 -7 0 -1 -3 -7 0 -2 -4 -7
20 0 -1 -4 -11 0 -2 -5 -11 0 -4 -7 -11
25 0 -2 -5 -15 0 -3 -6 -15 0 -5 -8 -15
30 0 -2 -5 -16 0 -3 -7 -16 0 -5 -9 -16
35 0 -2 -5 -16 0 -3 -7 -16 0 -5 -9 -16
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 4: The longevity risk premium Rp (in basis points) of EIB/BNP longevity
bonds for di¤erent sizes of the initial equity capital, W0 = [10000; 1000; 100] million,
and di¤erent risk aversion specications  (W0) =  (W0)
 b ; with  = 3;
b = [1; 14 ;
1
8 ; 0]: The size of the insured pool is N = 100 million, K = 1.
Table 4 presents the risk premium Rp (in basis points) of the coupon-based
longevity bonds with maturity T = 1; :::; 35 year. The results show two things.
First, the risk premium increases as the maturity of the bond increases. The risk
premium for short maturity (T  5 years) is small, less than one basis point. The
minimum risk premium for long maturity (T = 30) is around 7 to 9 basis points
(taking b = 1=8). Second, the risk premium depends on the nancial position of
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the insurer. The larger initial equity a rm has, the lower risk premium the rm
requires (except for the CARA case (b = 0)). The face value of the EIB/BNP bond
issue was 540 million and the bond had a 25-year maturity. The initial coupon
was set at 50 million, which is comparable with the initial payments NK = 100
million assumed here. By the end of 2005, EIBs own fund amounts to nearly
30000 million, which is comparable with the initial equity W0 = 10000 million
assumed here. The left panel with W0 = 10000 indicates a (sell-side) minimum
required risk premium of ve basis points with b = 1=8 for 25 years maturity.
4.4.3 Implications
The implication that we can get from the above results is that longevity risk
premium depends on the nancial position of the insurer. Large equity nancial
institutions may require a lower risk premium. Put di¤erently, smaller issues
(smaller K) may require lower risk premium. In order to avoid too high risk
premia, it might be helpful to have many large institutions all issuing moderate
amounts of longevity bonds, linked to the same survivor index.
4.5 Pricing of Other Longevity-Linked Securities
In this section, we look at other types of longevity-linked securities, including
swaps, deferred starting bonds, oors and caps. Since the market is incomplete,
we will show that di¤erent payo¤ structures may lead to di¤erent risk premia.
4.5.1 Vanilla Longevity Swaps
Vanilla longevity swaps have the same risk structure, E[St]  St, as the longevity
bonds. The insurer or the investment bank pays the counterpart the di¤erence
between the expected and realized mortality. Analogize to interest rate swap,
the xed leg is E[St]; and the oating leg is St: The required risk premium of a
longevity swap is the same as in a longevity bond with the same maturity and the
same amount of notional issues (Table 4). The main advantages of swap lie in a
much lower up-front capital requirement and lower credit risk, as compared with
a long maturity longevity bond.
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4.5.2 Deferred Longevity Bonds
A deferred longevity bond starts paying the longevity-linked coupons s years after
the issuance, till the bond maturity in year T . An advantage of a deferred longevity
bond is that it skips the ine¤ective hedge coupons in the rst few years, and
hence requires much less up-front capital than an immediate coupon paying bond.
Following the same pricing principle as in Section 4, the risk loading of a deferred







where  is the shorthand notation for  (W0) = W
 b
0 andGt  E [exp (  (E[St]  St))] :
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# year best
defer estim. b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
0 13,1 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 2%
5 8,6 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 2%
10 5,2 0% 0% 1% 4% 0% 1% 2% 4% 0% 1% 2% 4%
15 2,7 0% 1% 2% 6% 0% 1% 2% 6% 0% 2% 3% 6%
20 1,2 0% 1% 2% 8% 0% 1% 3% 8% 0% 2% 4% 8%
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 5: The normalized risk loading, =best estimate, of the deferred longevity
bonds, for di¤erent sizes of the initial equity capital, W0 = [10000; 1000; 100]
million, and di¤erent risk aversion values  (W0)
 b ; with  = 3; b = [1; 14 ;
1
8 ; 0]:
N = 100 million, K = 1.
# year
defer b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
0 0 -2 -5 -16 0 -3 -7 -16 0 -5 -9 -16
5 0 -2 -6 -17 0 -3 -8 -17 0 -6 -10 -17
10 0 -2 -7 -21 0 -4 -9 -21 0 -7 -12 -21
15 0 -3 -9 -26 0 -5 -12 -26 0 -9 -15 -26
20 0 -3 -10 -30 0 -6 -13 -30 0 -10 -18 -30
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 6: The longevity risk premium Rp (in basis points) of deferred longevity
bonds, for di¤erent sizes of the initial equity capital, W0 = [10000; 1000; 100]
million, and di¤erent risk aversion values  (W0)
 b ; with  = 3; b = [1; 14 ;
1
8 ; 0]:
N = 100 million, K = 1.
Tables 5 and 6 show the relative risk loadings and the risk premia of several
deferred longevity bonds. The following results assume that all deferred longevity
bonds mature in 35 years, but the rst coupon payments could start 5, 10, 15 or 20
years after the issuance. Notice the rst row in the tables is an immediate starting
bond for comparison. The initial capital is much smaller than the immediate
starting bond, but the relative risk loading is much larger. As a consequence, the
required risk premia are also larger than the immediate starting bond.
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4.5.3 Longevity Floors and Longevity Caps
For the case of a longevity oor, the payo¤ structure is min[E[St]  St; 0]. When
the number of survivor is greater than the expected, the insurer faces a longevity
loss. The payo¤ structure of a longevity cap is max[E[St]   St; 0]. The insurer
makes longevity prot when the number of survivor is less than the expected.
The risk premium of longevity oor and cap can be obtained in similar way based
on the equivalent utility approach. The company derives her utility from dividends
and the residual claim ([E[St]  St] )12. Following the martingale approach, the












e rt lnG+t dt (4.22)













Table 7 compares the longevity risk premium Rp (in basis points) of longevity
bonds, longevity oors and longevity caps respectively.
maturity bond floor cap bond floor cap bond floor cap
5 0 -3 3 0 -3 3 -1 -3 3
10 -1 -5 4 -1 -5 4 -2 -5 4
15 -2 -7 5 -3 -7 5 -4 -8 5
20 -4 -9 7 -5 -10 6 -7 -11 6
25 -5 -11 8 -6 -12 7 -8 -14 7
30 -5 -12 8 -7 -13 8 -9 -15 8
35 -5 -12 9 -7 -13 8 -9 -15 8
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 7: The longevity risk premium Rp (in basis points) of longevity
bonds, longevity oors and longevity caps, for di¤erent sizes of the initial
equity capital, W0 = [10000; 1000; 100] million, and di¤erent risk aversion
values  (W0)
 b ; with  = 3; b = 18 : N = 100 million, K = 1.
12 [E[St]  St]
 
 min (E[St]  St; 0) ; [E[St]  St]
+
 max[E[St]  St; 0]
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We observe three things from Table 7. First, the risk premium of the longevity
oor is larger (in absolute terms) than that of the longevity bond. This is because
the payo¤ of the longevity bond is symmetric, whereas the payo¤ of a longevity
oor is highly asymmetric. Therefore a higher risk premium is required for bearing
losses only. Second, the risk premium of the long position in this longevity caps
is positive, which means that the insurer pays for the call option. The more risk
averse the insurer is, the less willingness to pay (read: compensate) the counter-
part, for receiving the uncertain prot. Thirdly, as the initial wealth decreases
(hence the relative risk aversion increases), the value of the oor increases.
4.6 The E¤ect of Natural Hedging
It is known that term insurance policies provide a natural hedge for the imme-
diate annuities (see, e.g., Cox and Lin (2004)). The term insurance pays out a
certain amount of death benet if the policy holder dies before the contract ex-
pires. Since longevity shocks a¤ect all age cohorts in the same direction, the
unexpected increase in annuity payments to the retirees can be partially o¤set
by the unexpected reduction of death benet payments linked to the younger co-
horts. The availability of natural hedging clearly a¤ects the risk premium of the
longevity bond issuance company. This section examines the magnitude of this
e¤ect on the pricing of longevity bonds.
Suppose that the longevity bond issuance company bears the risks from both
the term insurance policies linked to a group of 35-year-olds in 2004 and the
longevity bonds linked to a group of 65-year-olds in 2004. Further, suppose that
the estimated Lee-Carter 1992 model is the true process governing the future
mortality dynamics. The number of deaths for the 35-year-old cohort in year











; where Bt denotes the ratio of death benet
relative to the annuity payout K (=1, which is the agreed annuity payments). The
(unexpected) shocks from the longevity bonds are captured by E[S65t ]  S65t :The
combined unexpected shocks from the term insurance and the longevity bonds can
be denoted by Zt as
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As explained in Section 4, the minimum longevity risk loading hedge required
by the seller is determined by setting V ;hedge0 = V0; where V
;hedge





























Following a similar argument as in Section 4.2, equalizing V ;hedge0 = V0; we






e rt lnGhedget dt (4.25)
where Ghedget  E [exp (  (Zt))] ; measuring the certainty equivalent of the com-
bined shocks Zt.
The following example illustrates the e¤ectiveness of natural hedging. In this
example, the level of death benets linearly decreases over time,13 i.e., Bt =
T +1  t; for t = 1; 2; :::; T: Figure 3 compares the term insurance with the payout
volatility of the longevity bonds with a term insurance with decreasing death
benets. The volatility of the combined shocks is much lower than that of the
longevity bond alone. However, the hedging is not perfect. Table 8 shows the
minimum required risk premia, Rp; which is clearly reduced when natural hedging
is available. The risk premia are more than halved compared with the case without
natural hedging.
13Decreasing death benet is very common in life insurance policies bundled with mortgages
for young households. As mortgages are paid o¤ over time, the amount of death benet decreases.
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FIGURE 3: The volatility of payouts of the longevity
bond and the term insurance separately and combined.
equity
maturity b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
15 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 -1 -2 0 -1 -1 -2
20 0 0 -1 -5 0 -1 -2 -5 0 -1 -3 -5
25 0 -1 -2 -6 0 -1 -3 -6 0 -2 -3 -6
30 0 -1 -2 -7 0 -1 -3 -7 0 -2 -4 -7
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 8: The longevity risk premium Rp (in basis points) of longevity bonds
when natural hedgeing is available (Bt = T + 1  t).
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4.7 The Demand Side Pricing and Basis Risk
4.7.1 Demand Side Pricing
The demand side pricing considers the maximum price BUY that the buyers (e.g.,
annuity providers) are willing to pay for the longevity bond or other securities in
order to be fully insured against the longevity risk. From buyers point of view,
BUY can be derived in the same framework as in Section 4. Assume an annuity
provider sold annuities to a cohort retiring in 2004 at age 65. The shareholder
of this annuity provider derives her utility from dividends and nal wealth. We
still consider two situations. In the rst scenario, the annuity provider bought
the ideal EIB/BNP survivor bonds at price BUY so that the longevity risk from
her annuity contracts is completely insured. In the second scenario, the annuity
provider bears the longevity risk herself.
Problem 3 without longevity risk
Assume a complete nancial market, with constant risk free rate, r: The annu-
ity provider derives her utility from dividends and nal wealth at the end of the
horizon. The company bought the ideal EIB/BNP survivor bonds for BUY ; such
that the longevity risk is completely hedged. The company maximize her utility







V 0 = E
Z T
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e tu (Dt ) dt+ e












=W0   BUY (4.27)
Problem 4 with longevity risk
In the same nancial market, this annuity provider did not buy any longevity
bond, and hence bears the longevity risk herself. The company derives her utility
from dividends and the residual claim (E[St]   St) from the longevity risk. The
longevity risk is not hedgeable from the nancial market. The company maximizes
her utility by optimizing asset allocation and dividend decisions.















Applying the equivalent utility pricing argument, we want to nd the minimum
risk compensation BUY such that the company is indi¤erent from bearing the
longevity risk and without the longevity risk, that is,
V 0 (
BUY ) = V0: (4.30)






e rt lnGBUYt dt: (4.31)
where GBUYt denotes
GBUYt  E [exp (  (E[St]  St))] (4.32)
The maximum premium that a buyer of the longevity bond is willing to pay
has the same form as the minimum premium that the bond issuance company
requires. It is common to assume that the longevity bond buyer is more risk
averse than the bond issuance company, or the nancial position of the buyer is
weaker than the seller.
The buyers maximum price is also inuenced by whether or not natural hedg-
ing is possible. The availability of natural hedging could reduce the buyers price
signicantly. Furthermore, the presence of basis risk and the risk sharing possi-
bility will also a¤ect the buyers maximum price.
4.7.2 Basis Risk
An ideal longevity bond which provides a perfect longevity hedge should be linked
to the annuitant population of the annuity provider. However, quite often this
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is not the case. There is a discrepancy between the reference population that
the bond is linked to and the annuitant population of the bond buyer. Although
the survival probabilities of the two populations might be (highly) correlated, the
longevity bond buyer still exposes to the remaining unhedgeable part, the so-called
basis risk. As a real life example, the EIB/BNP longevity bond, although linked
to the British survivor index, was also marketed among Dutch pension funds.
The idea is that the Dutch survivor index may be highly correlated with the
British one. The question here is whether 20 basis points is a good deal or not for
Dutch pension funds. This depends on the correlation between Dutch and British
mortality rates. The correlation between the innovations of the latent factors
(4UKt and 4NLt ) is about 0.8, based on 1880-2003 data from both countries,
with 4t  t   t 1. The remaining part of the section examines the impact of
basis risk on the pricing of longevity risk.
The basis risk between the British and the Dutch annuitant population can be
captured by ZBasisRiskt dened as





Based on the expression for buyers maximum acceptable price (4.31), we can

















Assume that the Dutch pension fund has the same preference and the same
level of equity as the longevity bond issuance company, and also assume that the
Dutch pension fund has no natural hedging possibility. If without basis risk, that
is, if there were a longevity bond linked to the Dutch population, then we get the
following maximum acceptable longevity risk premium Rp as given in Table 9
14.
14The risk premium for Dutch population (Table 9) is higher than the minimum required
risk premium for British population (Table 4), due to the fact that the estimated volatility
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However, since there is no such longevity bond linked to the Dutch population
directly, but linked to the British population, the hedging will not be perfect. The
basis risk between the two population will reduce the risk premium. Indeed, the
demand side risk premium in Table 10 (with basis risk) is lower than that of in
Table 9 (without basis risk).
equity
maturity b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
5 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 -1 -2 0 -1 -1 -2
10 0 -1 -2 -7 0 -1 -3 -7 0 -2 -4 -7
15 0 -2 -5 -15 0 -3 -7 -15 0 -5 -9 -15
20 0 -3 -8 -23 0 -5 -11 -23 0 -8 -14 -23
25 0 -3 -10 -28 0 -6 -13 -28 0 -10 -17 -28
30 0 -3 -10 -30 0 -6 -14 -30 0 -10 -18 -30
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 9: Without basis risk, the buyers maximum longevity risk premium Rp
(in basis points) for Dutch pension fund with di¤erent initial equity capital levels,
and di¤erent risk aversion values  (W0)
 b ; with  = 3; b = [1; 14 ;
1
8 ; 0]: The size of
the insured pool is N = 100 million, K = 1.
equity
maturity b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0
5 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
10 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 -1 -2 0 -1 -1 -2
15 0 -1 -2 -6 0 -1 -3 -6 0 -2 -4 -6
20 0 -1 -4 -11 0 -2 -5 -11 0 -4 -7 -11
25 0 -2 -6 -16 0 -3 -8 -16 0 -6 -10 -16
30 0 -2 -7 -18 0 -4 -9 -18 0 -7 -12 -18
w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100
TABLE 10: With basis risk, the buyers maximum longevity risk premium Rp (in
basis points) for the same Dutch pension fund as in Table 9.
dNL" = 0:2176 is higher than the British counterpart (see Appendix A.1).
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4.8 Conclusion
Longevity risk imposes serious solvency issues on pension plans and insurance
companies. Longevity-linked securities are desirable instruments for buyers and
sellers, but are not traded yet in nancial markets because of the pricing di¢-
culty. To tackle the pricing problem, we propose a new pricing method, which is
suitable for incomplete market pricing, exible and consistent with other nancial
risk premia. Our methodology is based on the equivalent utility pricing principle.
The obtained range of the longevity risk premia captures the sellers minimum
price and the buyers maximum price. We apply the method in pricing various
longevity-linked securities (bonds, swaps, caps and oors) linked to the U.K. and
the Dutch mortality data. We show that the size of the risk premium depends on
the payo¤ structure of the security due to the market incompleteness. Given a
plausible range of risk aversion, nancial position and other assumptions, we show
that the resulting risk premia are consistent with the limited market observation
and consistent with other nancial risk premia (e.g., ination risk premium). We
also show that the impact of natural hedging is potentially signicant. The re-
sults provide design implications for longevity-linked securities and longevity risk
management.
134 Longevity Risk Pricing
4.9 Appendix A: The Lee-Carter 1992 Model
This appendix provides a more detailed treatment of the model, together with
the estimation and simulation procedures. Following the Lee Carter 1992 model,





determined by a common latent factor t with an age specic sensitivity x and





= x + xt + t (4.35)
with the latent factor satises a random walk with drift process as
t = c+ t 1 + "t (4.36)










































+ (t+s   t)
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+ (t+s   t)
!
(4.38)
Since about 95 percent of the variance in the long-term forecasts is generated
by the innovation of the latent factor t; as reported by Lee and Carter (1992),
one can simplify the forecast formula of x;t+s as
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The survival probability of the x-year-old over one year, assuming that the
force of mortality is constant during the year x+u;t+u = x;t (0  u < 1), is given
by














4.9.1 Estimation Procedure of LC92 Model
Let Y denote the matrix of log mortality rates, with each row for each age group
lnx for N historical observations. We rst construct a demeaned matrix of log
mortalities, X = Y   x; where x is the mean value of lnx; and  is a row
vector of ones. Then, as proposed by Lee and Carter (1992), we can use Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) to estimate the latent factor t and the age-specic
sensitivity x: X = USV
0: Since the rst singular value is signicantly larger than
other singular values, one can use one factor to approximate the log of force of
mortality, as proposed by Lee and Carter (1992). x is the rst column of U
(multiplied by -1 to keep t a downward sloping trend), and t is the rst element
of S times the rst column of V (multiplied by -1 to keep t a downward sloping
trend). The straightforward estimations of the drift parameter c, the variance of
the innovation of the latent factor, and the variance of the estimated c are given
by:





















The estimated latent process (in the United Kingdom) is the following, includ-
ing two temporary shocks captured by a WWI dummy and a WWII dummy:
UKt =  0:0725 + UKt 1 + 0:65 WWIt + 1:9 WWIIt + "t (4.42)
with dUK" = 0:169:
The estimated latent process (in the Netherlands) is the following, including
two temporary shocks captured by a u dummy and a WWII dummy15:
NLt =  0:0748 + NLt 1 + 1:85  flut + 0:63 WWIIt + "t (4.43)
with dNL" = 0:2176: As pointed out in Lee-Carter (1992), the dummy variables
only reduced the standard errors of the mortality forecast, but not the trend itself.
4.9.2 Simulation
The simulation steps:
1. simulate the latent factor for T periods according to t+i = bc+ t+i 1+ "i;




; and t = 2003 which is the last  obtained
from the estimation.





for i = 1; :::; T;
3. compute the survival probability of the x-year-old cohort according to
15The u dummy takes non-zero values for years { 1918 = 1; 1919 = -1} and zero elsewhere.
The WWII dummy takes non-zero values for years { 1940 = 1; 1941 = 1; 1942 = 1; 1943 = 1;
1944 = 1; 1945 = 1; 1946 = -6} and zero elsewhere.







; for  = 1; :::; T
4. compute the survival index St = Ntpx; where N is the initial size of the
cohort.
5. repeat 1-4 steps forM times. As a by-product, calculate the mean, variance,
and condence interval of the forecasted survival probabilities and the survival
index.
4.10 Appendix B: Derivation of the Results in Section
4
First introduce some notations. For any given value of b, we have the marginal
utility as u0 (x) = exp ( x) ; and the inverse function of marginal utility u0()
as Iv =   1 ln (z) : The inverse function of the utility function is denoted as Iu =
  1 ln ( z) :
Problem 1 (continued)
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Plug into the budget constraint and the indirect utility function, we have































































Since longevity risk, E[St]   St; cannot be hedged in the modelled nancial
market, the optimal strategy, Dt , is independent from E[St]   St: Under the
assumed preference (4.10), the above Lagrange can be rewritten as
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Gt  E [exp (  (E[St]  St))]
and  is the shorthand notation for  (W0) = W
 b
0 : Gt can be seen as a function
of the certainty equivalent of E[St]  St.
The optimal dividend strategy can be found by
@L
@Dt
= 0 ) e tu0 (Dt )Gt = Mt
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Plug into the budget constraint and the indirect utility function





















































Equalizing the two indirect utilities (4.46) and (4.52), V0 = V

0 , we nd
 = :
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The di¤erence between the two budget constraints gives the expression for longevity





















The risk loading is a present value of the certainty equivalent compensations
1
 lnGt for the risks St E[St]: This compensation is paid out as part of dividend
in each period, as shown in the optimal dividends policy (4.48).
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Door de stijging van de levensverwachting en de daling van de vruchtbaarheid
in het verleden en in de nabije toekomst staan publieke pensioenstelsels (ge-
nancierd middels het omslagstelsel) onder toenemende druk, met als gevolg een
verschuiving in de richting van kapitaalgedekte pensioensystemen als de belan-
grijkste bron van pensioeninkomsten. Tot het begin van deze eeuw waren tradi-
tionele kapitaalgedekte pensioensystemen voornamelijk collectieve dened-benet
(DB) regelingen, gegarandeerd door de overheid en de werkgever. Echter, de ver-
grijzing en nieuwe boekhoudregels op basis van marktwaardering van verplichtin-
gen hebben als gevolg gehad dat de nancieringskosten van deze traditionele DB
regelingen dramatisch is geëscaleerd  en het is een worsteling geworden voor pub-
lieke en private sponsoren om aan hun verplichtingen te voldoen. Voornamelijk
gedurende de crisis van 2001-2003 zijn veel DB regelingen ofwel niet meer toe-
gankelijk voor nieuwe deelnemers, ofwel compleet bevroren. Overal ter wereld
voelden kapitaalgedekte regelingen wereldwijd zich genoodzaakt om hun regelin-
gen te hervormen.
In de afgelopen jaren zijn kapitaalgedekte pensioensystemen twee richtingen
opgegaan. De eerste richting is de afscha¢ng van het collectieve karakter in de
richting naar individuele pensioenregelingen waarbij de nanciële risico´s volledig
verschuiven van de sponsor naar de individuele deelnemer. De individuele dened-
contribution (DC) regelingen zijn hier typische voorbeelden van. Echter, DC
regelingen verschuiven niet alleen de risico´s naar de individuele deelnemer, maar
confronteren de deelnemer ook met complexe investeringsbeslissingen. De tweede
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richting behoudt het collectieve karakter van kapitaal gedekte DB regelingen, maar
verdeelt de nanciële risico´s over alle stakeholders (gepensioneerden, werknemers
en de sponsor). Verscheidene hybride collectieve regelingen zijn hiervan typische
voorbeelden geworden. Hiermee komt de vraag naar boven hoe de risico´s van het
pensioenfonds verdeeld dienen te worden onder de stakeholders. Is de ene richting
beter dan de andere richting, of kunnen beide richtingen verbeterd worden? Dan
zijn de vragen die dit proefschrift probeert te beantwoorden.
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan ons economische begrip van de relatieve kracht
en zwakheden van zowel collectieve als individuele pensioensystemen en intro-
duceert verschillende voorstellen voor de verbetering van kapitaalgedekte pen-
sioensystemen. In een notendop ligt de economische toegevoegde waarde van
collectieve systemen in e¢ciënte risicodeling, en het ontbreken daarvan is tevens
de zwakte van individuele systemen. De kracht van individuele systemen ligt in
de mogelijkheden af te stemmen op de heterogene preferenties van deelnemers. De
volgende generatie pensioensystemen zou daarom de krachten van beide werelden
moeten combineren. Dat wil zeggen dat de intergenerationele risicodeling uit col-
lectieve regelingen alsmede de levensloopkarakteristieken uit individuele regelingen
behouden blijven. In de resterende hoofdstukken zullen deze argumenten verder
uitgewerkt worden.
Hoofdstuk 2 (Intergenerational risk-sharing in funded pension schemes) van
dit proefschrift legt de focus op een uniek aspect van collectieve pensioenregelin-
gen: de mogelijkheid tot intergenerationele risicodeling (IRD) tussen werknemers
en gepensioneerden in dezelfde pensioenregeling. De lange termijn karakteristieken
van collectieve pensioenregelingen maken het mogelijk dat risicos kunnen worden
gedeeld tussen vele generaties. Collectieve pensioenregelingen gebaseerd op IRD
hebben daarmee bredere mogelijkheden tot het verdelen van en verzekeren tegen
risicos in vergelijking tot individuele systemen die zich beperken tot de onzek-
erheden van een enkel individu. We laten zien dat goed georganiseerde inter-
generationele risicodeling binnen realistisch ontworpen collectieve systemen wel-
vaartsverhogend kunnen zijn in vergelijking tot optimaal individueel pensioens-
paren. Deze bevinding heeft belangrijke implicaties voor pensioenhervormingen
in zowel collectieve als individuele pensioenregelingen. Bij zulke hervormingen
dient de mogelijkheid tot intergenerationele risicodeling behouden te blijven en
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versterkt te worden, en dus niet te worden afgeschaft. Onze casus laat zien dat
IRD implementeerbaar is in realistische pensioenfondsen.
Hoofdstuk 2 is sterk gerelateerd aan drie onderzoeksgebieden: Asset Liability
Management (ALM), Intergenerationele risicodeling (IRD) en Contingent Claim
Analysis. Het traditionele ALM raamwerk neemt het DB beleid met betrekking
tot contributies en uitbetalingen als gegeven en richt zich op de strategische be-
leggingsbeslissingen. Onze aanpak wijkt af van dit raamwerk, in de zin dat we het
ontwerp van contributie- en uitbetalingsbeleid integreren in het ALM raamwerk;
het pensioenbeleid (i.e. de regels tot het verdelen van risicos) worden daarmee
gezamenlijk met het beleggingsbeleid geoptimaliseerd. We laten zien dat het pen-
sioenbeleid niet alleen invloed heft op het beleggingsbeleid, maar ook op het wel-
vaartsniveau van de deelnemers. Voortbouwend op de IRD literatuur, die zich
voornamelijk richt op publieke nanciering, analyseren we of IRD wenselijk is
in kapitaalgedekte pensioenregelingen  en indien wenselijk hoe risicos optimaal
verdeeld dienen te worden. Onze waarderingsmethode is tevens consistent met
de waardering van verplichten op marktwaarde. Contingente claim waardering-
stechnieken maken het mogelijk om de marktwaarde van IRS te ontleden in call
en put opties in het bezit van de verschillende generaties. We laten zien dat, ex
ante, de marktwaarde van de call optie gelijk is aan de marktwaarde van de put
optie en dat IRS kan leiden tot een verhoging van de welvaart van deelnemers van
collectieven pensioenregelingen.
Echter, het moge duidelijk zijn dat collectieve pensioenregelingen met IRS ook
niet perfect zijn. Een belangrijk punt van kritiek is dat het uniforme beleid van
deze regelingen zichzelf niet leent voor het heterogene proel van de deelnemers.
Een dergelijke afstemming op het proel van de individuele deelnemer is exact
de kracht van een (ideale) individuele pensioenregeling. Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeerd
derhalve het ontwerp van een individuele DC pensioenvoorziening in een realistisch
gekalibreerd levensloop raamwerk.
De studie naar individuele DC pensioenregelingen in Hoofdstuk 3 (DC Pen-
sion Plan Defaults and Individual Welfare) dient een tweetal doelen. Ten eerste
zijn de optimale contributie en investeringsregels belangrijk voor aanpassingen in
het ontwerp van collectieve pensioenregelingen (bijvoorbeeld de opname van een
levensloopproel in collectieve beleidsregels). Dit leidt tot een nieuw onderzoek-
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straject op het gebied van inkomens- en leeftijdsafhankelijke beleidsregels voor
collectieve contracten. Ten tweede bevatten de resulterende optimale levensloop-
strategieën nuttige indicatoren voor het ontwerp van de default parameters van
individuele regelingen. Theoretisch gezien zijn deze default parameters irrelevant,
aangezien elke deelnemers de vrijheid heeft om de beleidsparameters naar eigen
inzicht te kiezen. In de praktijk echter observeren we dat de meeste mensen een-
voudigweg de default paramters volgen, die doorgaans leeftijdsonafhankelijk zijn.
Gegeven dat het default beleid van grote invloed is op het welvaartsniveau van
deelnemers, introduceert Hoofdstuk 3 een leeftijdsafhankelijke default beleid met
betrekking tot contributies en investeringen. We laten zien dat eenvoudige leefti-
jdsafhankelijke defaults een grote welvaartsverbetering voor deelnemers als gevolg
heeft (ten opzichte van het huidige leeftijdsonafhankelijke default beleid).
Hoofdstuk 3 bouwt voort op de levensloopliteratuur waarin consumptie en be-
leggingsbeslissingen over de levensloop geoptimaliseerd worden. Daarnaast is het
hoofdstuk gerelateerd aan de paper van Gomes, Michaelides and Polkovnichenko
(2006), waarin optimaal contributie- en beleggingsbeleid wordt geanalyseerd voor
rationele individuen voor het geval met belastbare DC besparingen alsmede het
geval waarbij de belasting op DC besparingen uitgesteld is. De modellering in
Hoofstuk 3 heeft een vergelijkbare opzet, maar met focus op het optimale leefti-
jdafhankelijke default contributie- en investeringsbeleid. Ook Gomes, Kotliko¤
and Viceira (2008) maken een welvaartsvergelijking tussen eenvoudige defaults,
maar zij bestuderen slechts de defaults voor beleggingsbeleid. We vinden dat de
default met betrekking tot de contributies (of besparingen) een grotere impact
heeft op het welvaartsniveau van het individu dan de keuzes met betrekking tot
het beleggingsbeleid.
Een vereenvoudiging die in hoofdstuk 3 gemaakt wordt heeft betrekking op de
individuele strategie tot het kopen van annuïteiten. Hoewel de keuze tot het kopen
van annuïteiten vereenvoudigd is op het individuele niveau, gaat Hoofdstuk 4 in
op het risicomanagement van sterfterisico op het geaggregeerde niveau. Trends in
sterftecijfers en de hieraan gerelateerde onzekerheden sturen in belangrijke mate de
globale vergrijzing met als gevolg de massale hervormingen in de pensioenwereld.
Zowel collectieve pensioenfondsen alsmede de verstrekkers van annuïteiten aan
individuele deelnemers aan DC regelingen zijn blootgesteld aan sterfterisico. In
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een aantal bekende gevallen heeft dit geleid tot aanzienlijke solvabiliteitsproblemen
voor pensioenfondsen en annuïteitverstrekkers.
Een e¤ectieve manier op sterfterisico te beheersen is het risico door te geven
aan de nanciële markt in brede zin via longevity linked securities. Echter, als
gevolg van de moeilijkheden met betrekking tot het prijzen van deze producten
worden ze niet verhandeld op nanciële markten.
Hoofdstuk 4 (Longevity Risk Pricing) introduceert een nieuwe methode voor
het prijzen van risicopremies op sterfterisico, met als doel om de obstakels van het
incomplete markt raamwerk te overkomen. We laten zien dat, als gevolg van de
incompleetheid van de markt, de hoogte van de risicopremie afhankelijk is van
het uitbetaligsschema van het product. Verder laten we zien dat de nanciële
kracht van de koper en verkoper van de sterfteverzekering, de beschikbaarheid
van natuurlijke beschermingsmogelijkheden en de aanwezigheid van basisrisico een
signicante invloed kunnen hebben op de hoogte van de risicopremie.
Hoofdstuk 4 combineert de literatuur op het gebied van het prijzen van nan-
ciële producten in een incomplete markt met de literatuur op het gebied van de
stochastische modellering van sterfterisico om de moeilijkheden met het prijzen
van innovatieve producten gebaseerd op sterfterisico te overkomen.
Op basis van deze bevindingen geeft dit proefschrift een aantal indicaties voor
richtingen voor de verbeteringen van pensioensystemen in de toekomst. De vol-
gende generatie pensioensystemen zou de krachten van collectieve en individu-
ele regelingen kunnen combineren. Hoe kan dit worden bewerkstelligd? De DC
regelingen kunnen bijvoorbeeld componenten voor winst- en risicodeling kunnen
toevoegen om IRD te repliceren. De collectieve regelingen zouden levensloop-
karakteristieken kunnen opnemen in hun beleid. Concluderend, om de pensioen-
zekerheid in een vergrijzende samenleving te kunnen blijven waarborgen zullen
aanpassingen in het ontwerp van pensioencontracten en innovaties in nanciële
markten integraal moeten verlopen.
